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INTRODUCTION
As the twenty-first century began, tort, contract, constitu-tional, and class-action attorneys throughout the world
were beginning to dip into the cornucopia of litigation opportuni-
ties against the deep-pocketed gambling interests.  Pro-gambling
interests were saddled with the media image of promoting an ac-
tivity which created new addicted gamblers (and associated sui-
cides), and caused bankruptcies and crime.  In this context,
plaintiffs’ attorneys focused on the prospect of sympathetic juries
and concomitant large damage awards.
Parallel to the 2001 publication of The Costs of Addicted Gam-
blers:  Should the States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the To-
bacco Cases? ,1 more lawsuits were filed in the United States and
Canada.2  By May 2002, “[l]awyers and activists [in Canada
were] . . . predicting a flood of lawsuits against government-run
gambling facilities.”3  One class-action suit in Quebec sought
“$625-million in damages, alleging the provincial gaming corpo-
ration knew or should have known that its video lottery terminals
created dangerous addictions.”4  Nancy Langille of Gambling
Watch commented:  “I see it as having national significance, if
not global significance.”5  One news source explained:
Just as bars and party hosts have been found liable for drunk-
driving accidents, operators of casinos, racetracks and other
betting venues will soon be forced into civil court battles to
answer for the effects their products have on addicts, legal ex-
perts predicted.  There are already anecdotal reports of indi-
vidual suits being filed in Ontario, then settled out of court
with clauses preventing the release of details, said Jim Hillyer,
a Toronto-area civil litigation lawyer studying the issue.6
1 John Warren Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers:  Should the States Initiate
Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases? , 22 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
17 (2001) [hereinafter Mega-Lawsuits].
2 Tom Blackwell, Gambling Case Can Go to Trial, Court Rules:  First Class-Action
Suit of Its Kind , NAT’L POST (Toronto, Ont., Can.), May 7, 2002, at A5, available at
2002 WL 19617084 [hereinafter Quebec Class-Action Suit].
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.  In August 2003, a similar class-action lawsuit was being prepared against the
province of Nova Scotia in Canada.  Dan Arsenault, Tory MLA Wants Study on
Price of Gambling , HERALD (Halifax, N.S., Can.), Aug. 21, 2003, reprinted at  Re-
sponsible Gambling Council, http://www.responsiblegambling.org/articles/Tory_
MLA_wants_study_on_price_of_gambling.pdf.  A University of Manitoba study
suggested that “problem gamblers end up costing government an average of $56,000
[Canadian]—to say the costs might outweigh the benefits. . . . Self-described patho-
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Thus, the Canadian lawsuits seemed to be setting the common
law precedents for the developing wave of gambling litigation.
In the Quebec class-action case, Justice Roger Banford of the
Superior Court summarized his initial findings and asks:
[E]ach and every member of the group is a pathological gam-
bler and therefore touched by this disorder; each member of
the group suffers from this sickness because of the
respondant’s fault; each member of the group is entitled to the
payment of a compensation still to be quantified; the extra-
contractual liability of the respondant:  Has the respondant a
responsibility to warn the users?  If so, has he fulfilled this
responsibility?7
These determinations are significant precedents.
In 2002, U.S. tort lawyers targeted gambling. Scott Harsh-
barger, the former Massachusetts Attorney General who took on
the tobacco industry, went after the gambling industry as Presi-
dent of Common Cause, a citizens’ group promoting government
accountability.8
Public health advocates and their litigators say . . . [pathologi-
cal (i.e., “addicted”)] gambling is a crisis that has reached epi-
demic proportions and something must be done to stop
casinos from injuring the many addicts who look to them to
feed their roughly $50 billion a year habit.
“It’s very similar to the drive to snort coke or smoke crack.
It’s that pressing, that urgent,” said [Professor] Henry Lesieur,
a gambling treatment therapist.9
Apologists for the gambling industry, however, resented the “de-
monization” of gambling and argued that gamblers assume the
risk of engaging in high-risk behavior.  Critics countered that
there was no assumption of the risk, because the risk was illusory
and artificial since the House always wins—eventually (the
“gambler’s ruin” principle).10  Nevertheless, policy experts con-
logical gambler Bernie Walsh of Halifax thinks he lost about $50,000 to the [video
gambling] machines—as well as his family—before he quit playing.  However, he’s
sure that he has cost the province much more [approximately $200,000] in treatment
and hospital costs because of the addiction.” Id.
7 Press Release, Garneau, Verndon, Michaud, Samson, The Class Action Against
Loto-Quebec Has Been Authorized (May 6, 2002).
8 Alisyn Camerota, Tort Lawyers Target Gambling , Fox News Channel, May 31,
2002, at  http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,54083,00.html [hereinafter Tort Law-
yers Target Gambling].
9 Id.
10 See id. ; see also  Judy DeHaven & Kate Coscarelli, Casinos Draw Talk of Law-
suits , STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 23, 2002, at 1, available at  2002 WL
23258317, reprinted as  Judy DeHaven & Kate Coscarelli, Gambling Industry Likely
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cluded:  “tobacco and gambling are just the beginning of a wave
of litigation against big industry.”11  Harshbarger, who helped
win $246 billion in damages from the tobacco industry, summa-
rized that if gambling facilities were “going to lure people to
come, and families to come, you need to deal with the reality that
this introduces potential addiction problems.”12
In 1997, as the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commis-
sion [hereinafter 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission or NGISC]
began its work, pro-gambling Commissioner John W. Wilhelm
sent a three-page memo to associates that effectively cautioned
“that, based on various legal analyses, the industry probably
[would not] be able to invoke trade secret protections to rebuff
any requests”13 for documents by the Commission.  Political col-
umnist Jon Ralston commented:
Considering the memo’s wide distribution—it was sent to
nearly two dozen people—Wilhelm knew the risk he was run-
ning in writing words that could become part of the public do-
main, sounding like a warning to the industry and giving fuel
to anti-gamers who have accused him of being an industry
shill.  But Wilhelm . . . obviously believed that the commis-
sion’s underlying danger was so pernicious for the [gambling]
industry, his workers and ultimately the state, that he had no
choice.
Wilhelm makes the case that anti-gaming forces hope to ex-
ploit the commission’s subpoena powers “to place the gaming
industry in a no-win situation:  Either you refuse information
requests and resists [sic ] subpoenas, making it look like you
have things to hide; or you comply with broad requests flow-
ing from the commission’s broad mandate . . . thus permitting
fishing expeditions.”14
Familiar with the gambling industry, Commissioner Wilhelm ap-
parently recognized that the Achilles’ heel of the gambling indus-
try was the process involving the legal discovery of information.
On a strategic level, Kansas City attorney Stephen Bradley
Small, who has sued casinos, predicted in 2000 that there were
Target for Next Big Suit , HONOLULU STAR-BULL., June 25, 2002, at C6. See infra
notes 80-81 and accompanying text.  For formulae demonstrating the gambler’s ruin
principle, see Michael Orkin & Richard Kakigi, What is the Worth of Free Casino
Credit? , AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, Jan. 1995, at 3-4 [hereinafter Free Credit].
11 Tort Lawyers Target Gambling , supra  note 8.
12 Id.
13 Jon Ralston, Column, Casinos and Smoking Guns , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 2,
1997, at 7B, available at  1997 WL 4552321.
14 Id.
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“Mega-Lawsuits” awaiting action by the attorneys general of va-
rious states.
Small said . . . [pathological (i.e., “addicted”)] gambling might
present deeper issues such as whether the industry, like the
tobacco industry, could someday be charged with creating the
addiction.
“If a person considers himself to have a compulsion to gam-
ble, the deeper question is why?  Is it extraneous to the gam-
ing industry or did the industry cause it?”15
During the 1990s, Small initiated some of the first well-publi-
cized lawsuits against gambling facilities, alleging violations of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.16  The
dean of pathological gambling issues, Professor Henry Lesieur,
chided governmental officials and the gambling industry:  “They
are not asking the hard questions.  How much are we [i.e., the
government/gambling industry partnership] contributing to the
problem?”17
If the hard questions are asked, the answers may come from, as
the Introduction notes, the Achilles’ heel of legal discovery of
marketing and other information from the gambling industry.
The inadvertent destruction of documents fostered by delays in
the discovery process could also make parties potentially vulner-
able—even to charges of obstruction of justice.  In class-action
cases, certification in gambling cases should be relatively easy
compared with other class-action lawsuits, because casinos and
video gambling machines track players via a variety of computer
programs, such as “Players Cards” and “Fun Cards.”
Part I of this discussion delimits the problematic areas and cat-
egorizes the potential lawsuits faced by the gambling industry
into:  (1) strategic lawsuits brought by state attorneys general or
federal authorities; (2) class-action lawsuits by those losing at
gambling; and (3) private lawsuits brought on behalf of individu-
als or groups of individuals.
As enumerated in Part II, “Clarification of Goals,” govern-
ments need to recriminalize electronic gambling devices (EGDs)
15 Stephanie S. Maniscalco, Gambling Addict Suits vs. Casinos Are Foreseen:
‘Self-Exclusion’ Program May Create Duty , MO. LAW. WKLY., Dec. 17, 2000, at 15
[hereinafter Self-Exclusion].
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).
17 Rick Green, Problem-Gambler Suits:  Activist Foresees Damage Claims , HART-
FORD COURANT, May 17, 2002, at A17, available at  2002 WL 4807090 [hereinafter
Problem Gambler Suits].
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and video gambling machines (VGMs) where those machines are
convenient to the public, which is practically everywhere.  This
goal was unanimously recommended by the 1999 U.S. Gambling
Commission.  The goal of maintaining the “fairness” of the
games is also discussed with regard to legal actions challenging
“fairness.”  The legal actions highlight two questions:  Is it unfair
for “fairness issues” and regulatory constraints to be determined
de facto by the owners and designers of the games?  In this re-
gard, is U.S. government-licensed gambling unconstitutional if its
net effect is to mislead people into losing, thereby depriving
them of their Fourteenth Amendment property “without due
process of law”?  The next section, Part III, on the history behind
these issues, reveals that legalizing gambling activities increases
illegal gambling and associated crime.  These analyses are fol-
lowed by a discussion in Part IV on “trends and conditioning fac-
tors” which focus on attempts by the lobbyists for pro-gambling
interests to control and confuse the information available not
only to the public, but also to the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commis-
sion itself.  Part V, “policy alternatives and recommendations,”
highlights the gambling industry’s Achilles’ heel—the legal dis-
covery of information—and the industry’s need to avoid litiga-
tion since plaintiffs’ attorneys can piece together information
from individual cases.
The Conclusion is that the enormous amounts of money that
pro-gambling interests have siphoned from various U.S. jurisdic-
tions has created a new class of elite pro-gambling scofflaws and
transformed many gambling interests into quasi-sovereigns chal-
lenging international, as well as U.S., judicial and governmental
systems.
A. Mega-Lawsuits and the Legal Discovery of Information:
The “Achilles’ Heel” of the Gambling Industry as the Discovery
of Marketing Information
In 1994, two separate lawsuits were filed in U.S. District Court
by Florida residents William Poulos and William Ahern against
multiple defendants in the gambling industry, and in 1995 these
cases were consolidated with similar cases in the District of Ne-
vada as Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc.18  The plaintiffs lost money
playing slot machines during the previous twenty years, and they
“claimed that the machines induced them to play by misrepre-
18 No. CV-S94-1126-RLH-RJJ, 2002 WL 1991180 (D. Nev. June 25, 2002).
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senting their actual odds of winning.”19  If plaintiffs prevailed in
this case, the defendants would be locked into a classic case of
fraud.  However, in 1997 the court granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to plead fraud with particularity but denied the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.20  The court gener-
ally denied defendants’ other motions to dismiss on various
grounds, such as:  (1) lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; (3) a stay on primary jurisdiction and
abstention grounds; and (4) the Act of State Doctrine.21
The approximately seventy defendants included cruise ship
casinos, land-based casino operators, and slot manufacturers.
The press recognized Poulos  was significant because the plain-
tiffs were “suing virtually every major casino operator and slot
manufacturer . . . [and] asking a federal judge for access to docu-
ments they say will prove a long-term effort was made by indus-
try players to intentionally mislead slot players.”22  Despite
obvious attempts by the defendants’ representatives to limit the
public’s knowledge of these potential issues, the Nevada press
outlined some salient but sensitive industry information, which
the discovery process could reveal.
Such documents could include marketing materials, memos,
presentation materials and slot operations manuals.  The
plaintiffs are also seeking access to casino player records,
which they claim will show that the playing habits of the de-
fendants are typical among slot players.  The amount of
records being sought is considerable; since [the plaintiffs]
would have to demonstrate a widespread history of such mar-
keting, [they] are demanding materials that go back a decade
or more.23
The fact that the discovery requests could reveal information
19 David Strow, Gamers Face Wider Fraud Lawsuit , LAS VEGAS SUN, June 22,
1999, available at  http://www.lasvegassun.com [hereinafter Fraud Lawsuit].
20 See id. ; Poulos , No. CV-S94-1126-DAE (RJJ) (D. Nev. Dec. 19, 1997) (granting
in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 9(b) for
failure to plead fraud with particularity and denying defendants’ motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim).
21 See , e.g. , Poulos , No. CV-S94-1126-DAE (RJJ) (D. Nev. Dec. 19, 1997) (Or-
ders:  regarding New Jersey casino defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction and defendant Delta Diversions, Inc., motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction; denying cruise ship defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; denying defendants’ motion for a stay on primary juris-
diction and abstention grounds; and denying defendant Princess Hotel’s motion to
dismiss under the act of state doctrine).
22 Fraud Lawsuit , supra  note 19.
23 Id.
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for over ten years was quite important.  Examples of the plain-
tiffs’ requests for information provided a blueprint for discovery
requests in other potential cases.
“What the plaintiffs are now seeking are any documents and
materials that will show slots and video poker machines have al-
ways been marketed in a misleading way, and that slot players
perceive the machines in the same manner as the defendants.”24
For example:
[A] video poker machine that claims it deals from a 52-card
deck, when in fact it deals from 10 preselected cards . . . . [or] a
slot that repeatedly places winning symbols near the payline,
giving the player the impression of just missing a big jackpot.
To achieve class action status, the plaintiffs [were] trying to
prove such methods are pervasive among the defendants.25
In addition to obtaining the discovery of information in the
United States, plaintiffs’ attorneys were well advised to note that
the defendant multinational corporations provided opportunities
to gather relevant information, including public information and
internal memos from overseas operations owned by United
States-based companies.
B. Delays in Discovery:  The Five-Year Hiatus in the Poulos
Nevada Case:  The Danger of Inadvertent Destruction of
Documents and Vulnerabilities to Obstruction of Justice?
Although Poulos  was first filed in 1994, the discovery process
for industry marketing information was apparently delayed until
1999.26  Interposing for delay would technically be an unethical
legal practice by any party to a suit.27  Also, in this case, any de-
lays in the discovery of sensitive marketing information would at
first appear to operate to the benefit of the gambling industry by
making the litigation process more expensive to plaintiffs without
“deep pockets.”  However, since the suit was filed in 1994 and
consolidated in 1995, the defendants (i.e., virtually every casino
operator, slot manufacturer, and cruise line) would technically be
on notice that no potentially relevant discoverable information
could be destroyed.  As the Arthur Andersen/Enron scandal of
2001 highlighted, the destruction of potentially relevant informa-
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 For examples of precedent, see CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 and
EC 7-38 (1970), reprinted in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY xvii (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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tion in itself—even when part of normal procedures—crosses
into the area of criminal behavior.28  What would happen in
Poulos  if it was later determined that relevant or potentially rele-
vant information had been destroyed inadvertently?  As a practi-
cal matter, the long relevant timeframe for the Poulos  discovery
requests put the defendants at perhaps greater risk because there
were higher probabilities for the inadvertent loss of discovery
information.
C. Class-Action Certification of the “Class” via the “Players
Cards” and “Fun Cards”
In Poulos , the plaintiffs filed a motion for class action status on
March 18, 1998, which the court initially denied because the class
was not “cohesive” enough, according to Judge Roger L. Hunt.29
In 2002, this denial was scheduled for appeal by David Barrett of
the New York City firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, to the
Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.30  Furthermore, as casino
companies began to issue more “Players Cards” (e.g., Harrah’s
Entertainment, Inc.) and “Fun Cards” (e.g., Casino Aztar in In-
diana) during the 1990s, it became relatively easier to identify
those who had lost funds gambling; losses are recorded for virtu-
ally everyone with a gambling-facility issued card.31  All of the
card owners/holders and their addresses (as well as credit rat-
ings) were consolidated in the computer marketing files of nearly
28 Kurt Eichenwald & Floyd Norris, Early Verdict on Audit:  Procedures Ignored ,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002, at C6, available at  LEXIS, News & Business, News, News,
All (English, Full Text); The Fall of Andersen:  Greed Tarnished Golden Reputation ,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2002, § 1, at 1, available at  2002 WL 26770388. See  Kristen
Hays, Enron Files Reorganization Plan , AP ONLINE, July 11, 2003, available at  2003
WL 59741154, reprinted as Plan Filed by Enron Leaves Little for Creditors , NEWS-
GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), July 11, 2003, at A11 (Bankrupt Enron’s creditors will
receive 14.4 to 18.3 cents on the dollar, while bankrupt WorldCom’s creditors will
receive 36 cents on the dollar.). See also Hearing on H.R. 3763, the Corporate and
Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002 Before the
House Comm. on Fin. Servs. , 107th Cong. (2002), available at  http://financialser-
vices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=96.
29 Vegas Federal Court Decision on Slots Favors Gambling Industry , ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWIRES, July 2, 2002, available at  WL, NV-News, reprinted as Vegas Fed-
eral Court Decision on Slots Favors Gambling , RENO GAZETTE-J., July 2, 2002;
Poulos , No. CV-S94-1126-RLH-RJJ, 2002 WL 1991180 (D. Nev. June 25, 2002).
30 Liz Benston, Gamblers To Appeal Ruling on Marketing of Slots , LAS VEGAS
SUN, July 16, 2002, at 1, available at  2002 WL 15200014.
31 E.g. , Fred Faust, Slot Machines Run Other Games Off the Table , ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 12, 1993, at BP1, available at  1993 WL 8014076 [hereinafter
Slot Machines Run].
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all gambling companies/facilities.  Therefore, the class became
more identifiable because the cards show “the losers” or “net
losers” consisting of practically everyone who gambled.
D. Blueprints for Legal Discovery in Gambling Issue Areas:
The American Trial Lawyers Association Gets
Focused on Gambling Facilities
In discovery proceedings, the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(b)(6) depositions in an Indiana case, Williams v. Aztar Indi-
ana Gaming Corp. ,32 blueprint some of the information to be dis-
covered, such as requests for state “License Renewal Reports”
and, to quote the Discovery Notice, “specifically, the information
which would disclose the following:”33
(a) The average amount of gambling losses per patron per
cruise or gaming session for those who visit[ed] the Casino
regularly;
(b) The average amount of gambling losses per year per pa-
tron for those who visit[ed] the Casino regularly;
(c) The average amount of gambling losses per year per pa-
tron for those who are or were issued “Fun Cards”; and
(d) The average amount of gambling losses per year per pa-
tron for those who are or were designated by the Casino
as belonging to the “Premium Passenger Club.”34
As leading edge cases, Williams35 and Poulos  provided
32 Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Aztar Indiana Gaming Company, LLC,
Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., No. EV-01-75-C-Y/H, 2003 WL 1903369 (S.D.
Ind. filed May 9, 2002). See also  Third Amended Complaint For Damages, id.  (filed
Jan. 4, 2002).  Summary judgment was entered on behalf of defendents. Id.  (Apr. 5,
2003).  The Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals heard arguments in Williams’
appeal on Oct. 22, 2003. See generally  Brief of Appellant, Williams v. Aztar Ind.
Gaming Corp., No. 03-1822, 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. filed July 14, 2003).
33 Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Aztar Indiana Gaming Company, LLC,
Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., No. EV-01-75-C-Y/H, 2003 WL 1903369 (S.D.
Ind. filed May 9, 2002).
34 Id.
35 See , e.g. , Terry Noffsinger, Presentation to the Casino Gaming Litigation
Group, Association of Trial Lawyers of America Annual Convention (July 23, 2002)
(public information from filed case complaint). See also  Laura Parker, Gambler
Says Casino Played Him , USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2003, at A3, available at  2003 WL
5305672.  Three cases similar to Williams , including one involving an addicted gam-
bler’s suicide, have placed the casino industry on the defensive. See  Rick Alm, Law-
suits Allege that Harrah’s Casinos Encouraged Troubled Gamblers , KAN. CITY STAR,
May 31, 2002, available at  2002 WL 19852997.  In Burdett v. Harrah’s Kansas Casino
Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-2166-KHV, 2003 WL 124665 (D. Kan. June 12, 2003), the
court decided discovery issues in favor of the plaintiff whose addicted gambler hus-
band committed suicide.  In another case, a casino’s extension of credit to a debtor
gambler did not constitute an act in “good faith,” and debtor’s trustee in bankruptcy
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blueprints for discovery requests by the attorneys involved, such
as Williams’ attorney, Terry Noffsinger from Evansville, Indiana.
By 2002, the Casino Gaming Litigation Group of the Association
of Trial Lawyers of America also was blueprinting the guidelines
for specialized discovery in lawsuits involving gambling issues.36
I
DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS
For organizational purposes, the mega-lawsuits faced by the
gambling industry during the twenty-first century could be organ-
ized into three major types.  First, public-interest “strategic” law-
suits could be brought by state attorneys general or federal
authorities.  Second, class-action lawsuits could be brought on
behalf of large classes of people.  Although individuals’ rights are
involved, these types of mega-lawsuits would be largely strategic
in their impacts.  Third, private lawsuits could be brought on be-
half of individuals or groups of individuals.
A. Potential Antitrust Cases and Subpoenaed Discovery
In 2002, Illinois Attorney General Jim Ryan’s office “subpoe-
naed top casino executives after they jetted to Chicago . . . to
devise a unified counterattack to the state’s steep casino tax in-
crease.”37  The object of these subpoenas was “to determine
whether the action taken at this meeting violate[d] state or fed-
prevailed.  Meeks v. Red River Entm’t (In re  Armstrong), 285 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th
Cir. 2002).  The debtor’s casino markers did not have to be paid by the bankruptcy
trustee.  Harrah’s Tunica Corp. v. Meeks (In re  Armstrong), 291 F.3d 517 (8th Cir.
2002).
By comparison, in Merrill v. Trump, Ind., Inc. , 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003), the
U.S. Seventh Circuit could not find under Indiana law any duty by Trump’s Indiana
casino to pathological gambler Mark Merrill to exclude him from the casino—even
after his clinic requested the exclusion on Merrill’s behalf.  However, this case was
decided in 2003, just before Indiana enacted a self-exclusion statute—despite the
efforts of Indiana Sen. Larry E. Lutz (R) (representing Casino Aztar’s district) to
kill the legislation or alternatively grant de jure immunity to casinos for most torts.
Sen. Lutz’s bizarre “immunity provisions” were stricken from the final bill. See
Conference Committee Report, Engrossed H.B. 1470, 1st Sess., § 4, ch. 16, at 3-4
(2003) (codified as amended at IND. CODE §§ 4-22-2, 4-33-4).
36 See , e.g. , Robin Reid Boswell, Obtaining the Casino’s Information , in ATLA
ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS:  CASINO GAMING 1783 (2002),
available at  2 Ann. 2002 ATLA-CLE 1783. See generally ATLA ANNUAL CONVEN-
TION, supra  at 1783.
37 Douglas Holt, Casino Meeting Notes Subpoenaed , CHI. TRIB., June 17, 2002,
§ 2, at 1, available at  2002 WL 2666206 [hereinafter Casino Notes Subpoenaed].
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eral antitrust law.”38  According to Argosy Gaming Chief Execu-
tive Officer James B. Perry, the “gathering was to discuss
lobbying efforts to rescind the tax increase,”39 and it was consid-
ered important as attested by the attendance of Boyd Gaming
Corp. Chief Executive Officer, William S. Boyd.40  If the state
legislators did not rescind the tax increase, casino executives re-
portedly “threatened” to cancel construction projects, layoff em-
ployees, slash marketing efforts, and reduce charitable
donations.41  This meeting “raised suspicions among state anti-
trust lawyers that the casinos [were] plotting anti-competitive
agreements to punish the state with reduced casino revenues un-
til the tax [was] lifted.”42  Paul Slater, an antitrust lawyer and
adjunct professor at Northwestern University School of Law,
commented:  “If they were saying, ‘We’ll reduce competition be-
tween our Illinois casinos in order to punish the State of Illinois,’
you could have a violation of the Sherman Act”43 which bars pri-
vate businesses from acting in restraint of trade.44
Regardless of any potential antitrust issues in this specific sce-
nario, the trend appeared to be toward attorneys general moni-
toring the gambling industry more closely—particularly in areas
such as Internet gambling activities.  During the 1990s several
state attorneys general filed suit against Internet gambling opera-
tions that were testing the law by violating the Interstate Wire
Act.45  The attorneys general included Hubert “Skip” Humphrey
III in Minnesota and Jeremiah “Jay” Nixon in Missouri.46  Pri-
vate citizens were also bringing successful lawsuits to retrieve
their losses from Internet gambling.47
38 Id. See generally  Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994); Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58
(1994). See also  Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-13(c) (1994).
39 Casino Notes Subpoenaed , supra  note 37.
40 Id.
41 Id. ; Jay Krall, Casino Executives Threaten Cuts in Illinois After Tax Boost ,
WALL ST. J., June 12, 2002, at B3, available at  2002 WL 3397559.
42 Casino Notes Subpoenaed , supra  note 37.
43 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
44 Casino Notes Subpoenaed , supra  note 37.
45 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
46 See , e.g. , Beth Berselli, Gamblers Play the Odds Online , WASH. POST., Aug. 19,
1997, at A1, available at  1997 WL 12882117; Charles Bowen, Whose Flag Flies Over
the Internet , STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 18, 1997, at 51, available at  1997
WL 12554431.
47 See , e.g., Online Gambler Sues Credit Companies , AP ONLINE, Aug. 17, 1998,
available at  1998 WL 6710706, reprinted as Online Gambling Suit Is Filed , BELLE-
VILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Aug. 18, 1998, at A2.
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B. Legalized Gambling Causes Crime
By the twenty-first century, the public interests in Canada, the
United States, and internationally were relearning what academ-
ics and police authorities had known and warned about as states
and communities decriminalized gambling during the 1980s and
1990s:  Legalized gambling activities cause increased crime.  The
trend was obvious in Canada, which served as a microcosm.
“The number of fraud and internal theft cases involving problem
gamblers . . . skyrocketed along with the expansion of casinos,
slot machines and Internet gaming in the last 10 years . . . [ac-
cording to] police, lawyers and addiction counselors.”48  The
comparisons between the costs of drug addiction and gambling
addiction49 were becoming increasingly obvious to the public and
government officials.
Sergeant Bud Snow, representing the Halifax police fraud
squad, commented:  “At one time, most of our large internal
thefts were drug-related.  Now they’re more or less gambling re-
lated. . . . Over the last few years, there are probably more and
more getting involved in stealing to support their gambling
habit.”50
In Canada, examples of criminal cases not only highlighted the
types of crimes committed by pathological (addicted) gamblers
but also revealed some of the underlying principles not com-
monly recognized by the public wisdom.
These bourgeois crooks tend to be trusted members of their
organizations, with families and nice homes and are just as
likely to be women as men .  They include one female bank em-
ployee in Saskatchewan who took her employer for $200,000,
was convicted, then later got caught stealing another $64,000.
A single video lottery terminal  sucked up all the money.
An RCMP officer who tailed organized crime figures
around Ontario’s casinos  stole from his unit’s expense fund to
feed his own gambling habit.  A stock broker siphoned money
from his clients to bankroll his wife’s wagering.51
48 Tom Blackwell, Gambling Addiction Fueling Crime , NAT’L POST (Toronto,
Ont., Can.), May 6, 2002, at A9, available at  2002 WL 19616841 [hereinafter Gam-
bling Addiction Fueling Crime].
49 See , e.g. , John Warren Kindt, Statement to the National Gambling Impact
Study Commission, U.S. and International Concerns over the Socio-Economics
Costs of Legalized Gambling:  Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem? (May 21,
1998) (transcript on file with Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n).
50 Gambling Addiction Fueling Crime , supra  note 48.
51 Id.  (emphasis added).
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As one problem-gambler summarized another truism, “[t]he casi-
nos . . . don’t care about compulsive [i.e., pathological and prob-
lem] gamblers.”52  As the negative impacts of gambling on
consumer businesses were highlighted in the early 1990s, by the
turn of the century increasing numbers of major businesses, such
as L.L. Bean and MBNA, were publicly  opposing gambling ini-
tiatives,53 in part because of problems caused by gambling costs
such as “lost work productivity” costs, criminal costs, and insur-
ance costs.54
Elsewhere, there is abundant evidence that gambling is turning
the middle class to crime.  One such community is Windsor, On-
tario, which opened one of the first Canadian casinos in 1994.
Detective Mike Kelly of the Windsor police is working on a
case involving an employee who stole $4-million from a local
manufacturer.  “He said it’s all gone to gaming and there is
very little hope of recovery.”
Windsor recorded a dramatic case . . . [in 2001], when Car-
men Lauzon, a Bank of Montreal manager, was convicted of
stealing $1.2-million from the accounts of clients at her branch.
Ms. Lauzon got a two-year jail sentence.55
By comparison, in 2002 the legal profession in Australia sued
to recover $1.77 million stolen by an attorney from trust ac-
counts, including $635,940 allegedly spent at the Crown casino.56
The plaintiffs took this legal action to recover money gambled by
a probable pathological gambler, lawyer Gabriel Werden, and
many believed the case was a case primae impressionis  for Aus-
52 Id. See generally , John Warren Kindt, Increased Crime and Legalizing Gam-
bling Operations:  The Impact on the Socio-Economics of Business and Government ,
30 CRIM. L. BULL. 538 (1994) [hereinafter Increased Crime and Legalizing
Gambling].
53 Compare  John Warren Kindt, The Negative Impacts of Legalized Gambling on
Businesses , 4 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 93 (1994), with  email from Office of President,
L.L. Bean, to All L.L. Bean Employees (April 17, 2003) (opposing casino gambling
in Maine), reprinted at  Citizens for a Stronger Pennsylvania, http://strongerpa.org/
gamblingdamage/llbean.htm, Grace Murphy, Credit Card Giant MBNA Embraces
Anti-Casino Stand , PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Me.), June 13, 2003, at 1A, available
at 2003 WL 58364669, and  Jason Clayworth, Casino Would Put Riverwalk Pledge at
Risk , DES MOINES REGISTER, July 8, 2003, at 1A, available at  2003 WL 59168102
(“Principal Financial Group will pull the plug on a proposed $25.5 million riverwalk
plan if [Des Moines] city leaders allow riverboat gambling near the project.”).
54 John Warren Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities ,
43 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 62, 85-86 (1994) [hereinafter Economic Impacts].
55 Gambling Addiction Fueling Crime , supra  note 48.
56 Geoff Wilkinson, Casino Sued for Lost Cash , HERALD SUN (Melbourne, Vict.,
Austl.), May 9, 2002, at 5, available at  LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All
(English, Full Text).
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tralia.57  The Australian “Supreme Court writ issued [in April
2002] by the Law Institute of Victoria’s professional standards
association [apparently relied] on a section of the Lotteries Gam-
ing and Betting Act.”58  The claim filed with the writ specified
“10 payments to Crown by Werden between June 1997 and Feb-
ruary 1998”59 as wagers, which should be recoverable under sec-
tion 67 of the Lotteries Gaming and Betting Act when stolen
funds were “paid to any person as . . . a wager or bet.”60
In Austria, another case was garnering international attention
when the Austrian Supreme Court in Vienna ruled in 2003 that
the country’s major casino chain had to refund £33,000 to a path-
ological (addicted) gambler.  This case was notable because it es-
tablished that “Austrian gamblers who lose large amounts of
money in casinos may be able to claim back some of their losses
if they prove they are addicted to gambling.”61
C. Addicted Gamblers, Criminal Defenses, and Civil Actions
Against Gambling Facilities
Like other addictions, by the 1990s “pathological gambling”
was more frequently surfacing in criminal cases as a mitigating
factor, and even as a defense arguing lack of mens rea (i.e., crimi-
nal intent).62
When addicted gamblers were convicted, civil suits against the
gambling facilities became an option.  For example, in 2000 a
Florida prisoner filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court against
“Donald Trump, his floating Trump Casino in Gary[, Indiana]
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Lotteries Gaming and Betting Act, 1966, § 67 (Austl.).
61 The Supreme Court in Vienna has . . . , GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 25, 2003, at
P5, available at  2003 WL 9520211; Compulsive Gambler Refunded Losses , Ana-
nova.com, at  http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_741340.html (Jan. 19, 2003).
62 Cf.  James H. Juliussen, Note, Compulsive Gambling and Mitigation of Work
Place Discipline:  A Step Too Far? , 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 711 (1991).  “Compul-
sive gambling” is the laymen’s term for the medical “pathological gambling.”  Con-
victed for bank robbery, Mark Merrill, for example, explored during his trial the
defense that pathological (addicted) gambling obviated the criminal intent necessary
for a conviction. See also  Merrill v. Trump Ind., Inc., 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003).
In an interesting argument, former Arizona Superior Court Judge William L.
Scholl, who was an addicted gambler, sought to have his convictions for filing false
tax returns overturned on appeal because of the “distortions in thinking and ‘denial,’
which impact [addicted gamblers’] ability and emotional wherewithall to keep
records.”  U.S. v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1998).  The Ninth Circuit U.S. Court
of Appeals rejected defendant’s arguments and affirmed his conviction.
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and its manager for $2.1 million, saying his continued gambling at
the casino led him to rob two Illinois banks.”63
In the average casino with thousands of surveillance cameras
and devices combined with casino “cards” which can theoreti-
cally track every casino chip and interface the wagering with the
casino’s computerized credit reports, one issue was the “duty” of
the casino to exclude an addicted gambler once notice of the ad-
diction was relayed to the casino.
Mark Merrill, 38, alleges he sought counseling in October 1996
for his gambling addiction and requested, by certified mail,
that local casinos evict or arrest him on sight as part of his
rehabilitation.  While at least one casino honored his request,
the Trump Casino in Buffington Harbor did not, according to
the lawsuit filed in federal court in Hammond.64
Regardless of the results in this case and the similar Williams
case, these issues in other jurisdictions also would interface with
legislated “self-exclusion” programs such as Missouri’s “List of
Disassociated Persons.”65
D. Gambling Causes Crime:  Therefore, File Class-Action Suits
Against Governments for Legalized Gambling Facilities:
Making Governments Pay for Gamblers’ Crimes
A prescient March 2002 article, Make Governments Pay for
Gamblers’ Crimes ,66 previewed the remarks of criminal lawyer
Brian Beresh at the University of Alberta’s conference on gam-
ing and justice issues:67
The government has knowledge that a certain percentage of
the population will become seriously addicted to gambling,
63 Bank Robber Sues Trump, Gary Casino for $2.1 Million , ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Feb. 8, 2000, available at  WL, IN-News.
64 Id.  In 2003, Merrill’s appeal probably failed because he basically appealed pro
se while incarcerated for robberies allegedly occasioned by his addicted gambling.
Merrill v. Trump Ind., Inc., 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003).  Accordingly, this case set
inappropriate precedents which were cited in a summary judgment rejecting the
claims of the pathological gambler in Williams , which claimed et alia  that Casino
Aztar owed a duty to keep a pathological gambler who was known to the casino
from gambling there.  Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., No. EV 01-75-C-TH,
2003 WL 1903369, at *7-8 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 5, 2003).  Summary judgment was ap-
pealed to Seventh Circuit in 2003.
65 MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 45-17.010 (2003).
66 Charlie Gillis, Make Governments Pay for Gamblers’ Crimes, Lawyer Says:
‘They’re Responsible’ , NAT’L POST (Toronto, Ont., Can.), Mar. 8, 2002, available at
2002 WL 15263581 [hereinafter Make Governments Pay for Gamblers’ Crimes].
67 Id.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE201.txt unknown Seq: 17  2-MAR-04 15:56
Subpoenaing Information from the Gambling Industry 237
particularly VLT [video lottery terminal] machines. . . . They
know there’s going to be a social consequence.  If the govern-
ment knows it has contributed to this dilemma, then it ought
to bear some of the responsibility for the loss that occurs to
employers and the rest of society.68
In common law countries, particularly the United States, a
type of qui tam69 legal action should also be considered as an
alternative form of lawsuit:70
What’s required is some expert evidence to show the direct
link between the governments’ actions—in this case, the ac-
quiescence to having the gambling machines—and the per-
son’s conduct,” [Beresh advised].  Garry Smith, a gambling
research specialist and co-ordinator of the conference, wel-
comed Mr. Beresh’s paper at a time when governments are
throwing open the doors to increased gambling.  “It’s certainly
worthwhile bringing it up.71
In 1999, after only seven years of Illinois casinos, Illinois pa-
pers began running editorial comments about suing the state it-
68 Id.
69 Enacted in 1863 to curb military procurement fraud, the False Claims Act al-
lowed the U.S. government and private plaintiffs (called “relators”) to recover dam-
ages from any person or organization which knowingly presented or caused another
party to present a false or fraudulent payment claim to the government.  31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-33 (1994); see also  Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 28 C.F.R.
§ 85.3 (2003) (increasing the civil monetary awards).  Recovery amounts included
the costs of the action, fines up to $11,000 per claim, and treble the government’s
damages. See  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3 (2003).  Historically in
common use, “10 of the first 14 statutes enacted by the first United States Congress
relied on qui tam  actions to aid the police enforcement role of government agen-
cies.”  Thomas R. Grande, An Overview of the Federal False Claims Act , in ATLA
ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1177 (2002),
available at  1 Ann.2002 ATLA-CLE 1177, 1179 (citing United States ex rel.  New-
sham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989)).
False Claims Act actions constituted a type of qui tam  action, which stood for the
Latin qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur  and translates
as “who as well for the King as for himself sues in this matter.” BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1262 (7th ed. 1999).  The legal definition of a qui tam  action is one filed by:
[A]n informer, under a statute which establishes a penalty for the commis-
sion or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same shall be recov-
erable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who will
bring such action and the remainder to the state or some other institution.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).  Between 1986 and 1999, more
than 3,000 suits were filed, primarily in the health care industry.  Robin Potter, False
Claims Act Litigation in Employment Cases—A View from Plaintiffs’/Relators’
Counsel , in ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 1207, 1208
(2002).
70 See generally supra  note 69.
71 Make Governments Pay for Gamblers’ Crimes , supra  note 66.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE201.txt unknown Seq: 18  2-MAR-04 15:56
238 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82, 2003]
self for the public’s gambling losses.  One columnist agreed with
a reader who summarized his feelings:72  “‘Every time I read the
word “gaming” I’m ready to throw up. . . . It is gambling.  No
matter what their spin doctors say, it is NOT a game . . . it is
gambling, pure and simple.  Nothing will change that.’”73  The
columnist also agreed with a reader who opined:  “When people
lose the farm, they should do exactly what the states have done
to cigarette and gun manufacturers[:]  Sue the states for causing
pain and suffering.”74  The tax revenues, which the states re-
ceived from gambling activities, would be dwarfed by the losses
which were dropped in casinos and other gambling venues.
“What a delightful class-action suit that would make.  Thousands
who have lost their food and rent money in the casinos or lottery
could join.”75  By the beginning of the twenty-first century such
class-action suits were gaining attention and momentum, such as
a $625 million class-action suit in Quebec, Canada.76
II
CLARIFICATION OF GOALS
A. Recriminalize Convenient Electronic Gambling Devices and
Video Gambling Machines As Recommended by the
1999 U.S. Gambling Commission
As unanimously recommended by the 1999 U.S. Gambling
Commission, convenience gambling available to the public via
electronic gambling devices [hereinafter EGDs], subcategories of
video gambling machines [hereinafter VGMs], and similar gam-
bling should be recriminalized,77 as South Carolina did in 2000.78
Kansas City attorney Stephen Bradley Small highlighted the
strategic liability faced by the U.S. gambling industry, particu-
larly regarding electronic gambling devices and concomitant
72 Jack Mabley, Column, Try Suing the State for Gambling Losses , DAILY HER-
ALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.), Nov. 3, 1999, at 18, available at  LEXIS, News & Busi-
ness, News, News, All (English, Full Text).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Quebec Class-Action Suit , supra  note 2.
77 See , e.g. , NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT para. 3-6,
at p. 3-18 (1999) [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT]; NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT
STUDY COMM’N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY para. 3-6, at 30 (1999) [hereinafter NGISC
EXEC. SUMMARY].
78 Sarah O’Donnell, Where to Haul 22,000 Poker Machines? , HERALD (Rock Hill,
S.C.), June 29, 2000, at A1, available at  2000 WL 6573944.
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video gambling machines, which by 2001 were producing 70 to 90
percent of the monies lost in casinos.79
“Small said video poker games are known to be especially ad-
dictive,”80 an issue highlighted by the 1999 U.S. Gambling Com-
mission.81  They are “the crack cocaine of gambling because they
are run by software designed by sophisticated people who know
how to maintain a player’s interest in the device by letting them
think they almost won the jackpot,” Small said, defining the prac-
tice as “psychological warfare.”82  “There are serious issues in-
volving fraud and fraudulent inducement to contract,” he said.83
During the mid 1990s, a loophole slipped into a South Carolina
statute by pro-gambling interests, allowing video and electronic
gambling throughout the state’s convenience store industry.84
The resultant crime and social disruption was so overwhelming
that convenience gambling via EGDs and VGMs was de facto
recriminalized via a South Carolina Supreme Court decision ef-
fective July 1, 2000.85
79 See , e.g. , Tom Gorman, Casinos Bet on High-Tech Slots to Improve Returns ,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at A20, available at  2003 WL 2385550.  Nationwide, video
gambling machines (VGMs) constitute seventy-five percent of total wagers. Id.  In
some Indian casinos (such as the Cherokee casino in North Carolina) and “racinos”
(combination racetracks and casinos), VGMs constitute 100 percent of the casino
revenues because there are no card games. See id.  Card games need employees, so
the trend in the 1990s was toward fewer card games.  For example, Las Vegas mar-
keting dictated that there be multiple venues for card games, and therefore only fifty
percent of Las Vegas casino revenues were attributable to VGMs. Id.  Of course,
VGMs required relatively few employees, and as VGM technologies consolidated
over time, fewer and fewer casino employees were needed as the twenty-first cen-
tury began. See , e.g. , New Slot Machine Technology Means Layoffs at Argosy ,
POKERMAG.COM, May 2, 2003, at  http://www.pokermag. com/managear-
ticle.asp?c=150&a=3702. See also  Fred Faust, Increasing Play of Slots Makes Casino
Table Game Disappear , ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1998, at BP2, available
at  1998 WL 3362223 (in 1998 Missouri’s slots provided 74.8% to 84.4% of casinos’
revenues); Slot Machines Run , supra  note 31, at BP12 (in 1983 for the first time
casino revenues in Nevada and Atlantic City “from slot machines exceeded the win
from table games” and by 1993 “casinos derive[d] at least 60 percent of their win
from slots”).  In 1996 USA Today  intimated that the search was being conducted for
a slot machine with an addictive game, termed “Gambling’s Holy Grail.”  J. Taylor
Buckley, The Quest for Gambling’s ‘Holy Grail ,’ U.S.A. TODAY, May 20, 2996 at
1A, available at  1996 WL 2055931 [hereinafter Gambling’s ‘Holy Grail’ Slot Addic-
tive Game].
80 Self-Exclusion , supra  note 15.
81 Cf. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, at p. 5-5.
82 Self-Exclusion , supra  note 15.
83 Id.  For an overview of issues involving video gambling (slot) machines, see
Gambling’s ‘Holy Grail’ Slot Addictive Game , supra  note 79.
84 See S.C. CODE §§ 12-21-2770 to 12-21-2809 (repealed 1999).
85 Joytime Distrib. & Amusement Co. v. State, 528 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1999) (hold-
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B. Reveal the Marketing Techniques of Gambling Interests
Pathological gamblers have been deterred from suing casinos
because of a public stigma greater than the “disgruntled loser”
tag traditionally applied to those who sue to recover losses.86
[T]he gambler [often is] skittish about going before a jury, said
[Professor I. Nelson] Rose.  The “embarrassment factor” of
not wanting to admit to massive debt and a mental illness, i.e. ,
a gambling addiction, deters many people from seeking their
day in court.  But as the public becomes more educated about
gambling—and more receptive to victimization defenses in
general—these barriers are coming down, he said.87
Unlike other basic marketing principles, the marketing of gam-
bling involves an overwhelming majority of patrons who are dis-
satisfied customers.  However, gambling patrons do not wish to
admit they are “losers”; so even as dissatisfied customers they
remain silent because of the social stigma of being “a loser.”88 A
fortiori , a pathological gambler will be in denial of being a loser
for even longer periods of time than the recreational gambler.89
Over time, a capitalist will win via education and expertise.
Over time, a gambler loses everything.90  A business risk in a
capitalistic economy is always winnable given education and ex-
pertise.  Over time, short-term failure brings the education to
succeed.
However, the artificial risk which defines gambling results in
the gambler losing everything (known as “gambler’s ruin”).91
Over time, the House wins everything, and the gambler loses
everything.92  Therefore, the House’s marketing is directed to-
ward keeping the gambler thinking that the gambler is winning
when in fact, over time the gambler is always losing.93
ing proposed referendum on video gambling machines was unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative power).
86 Diana Digges, Stakes Rise in ‘Compulsive Gambling’ Suits , LAW. WKLY. USA,
Nov. 26, 2001, at 16.
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 Free Credit , supra  note 10 (presenting formulae for “gambler’s ruin”).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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C. Utilize the State Statute Shibboleth:  The Term
“Compulsive” Gambler Indicates Inordinate Influence by
Pro-Gambling Interests
The standard reference book of the American Psychiatric As-
sociation is The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders , which delimits “pathological gambling.”94  Instead of
utilizing the proper terminology of “pathological gambling” (and
the concomitant term “problem gambling”), pro-gambling inter-
ests during the 1990s started insisting that their supporters utilize
the less-threatening term “compulsive” gambling, which oper-
ated to the public-relations benefit of pro-gambling interests.95
As the twentieth century ended, however, there was no single
mention of “compulsive” gambling in the The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—the proper terminology
was “pathological” gambling (and associated “problem” gam-
bling).96  When found in state statutes or regulations, references
to “compulsive” gambling were definitive signs of pro-gambling
influences’ direct impact on the drafted legislation or indirect im-
pact through naı¨ve draftsmanship.  Accordingly, litigators should
be alerted to regulatory legislation and self-exclusion programs
for pathological gamblers which fail the shibboleth by utilizing
the term “compulsive” gambler instead of the proper term “path-
ological” gambler.
D. Model Causes of Action on Cases which Include RICO:
Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co.
In Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co. , thirty-eight court-de-
scribed “habitual gamblers” brought suit in a South Carolina
state court claiming video poker operators violated state law as
well as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.97  The case was removed to U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of South Carolina, which granted partial summary judgment
for the plaintiffs.98  The video poker operators then appealed to
the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.99  The court of appeals
94 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 312.31, at 615-18 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
95 For a discussion and supporting materials analyzing changes in terminology,
see, for example, Mega-Lawsuits , supra  note 1, at 31, 32-34.
96 DSM-IV, supra  note 94.
97 Johnson v. Collins Entm’t Co., 564 S.E.2d 653, 657-58 (S.C. 2002).
98 Johnson , 88 F. Supp. 2d 499 (D.S.C. 1999).
99 Johnson , 199 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 1999).
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vacated the order on the basis that the district court “improperly
ruled on unsettled issues of the state law.”100  The district court
then certified questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court,
which held:
a. The prohibition on offering special inducements to play
video gaming machines was constitutional.101
b. The prohibition of offering the possibility of winning more
than $125 per day was not unconstitutionally vague and
did not violate procedural due process.102
c. This prohibition applied to people who leased machines to
others who maintained the place the machine was used.103
d. Violating the prohibition on special inducements was an
act subject to prosecution under the statute.104
e. Violating the prohibition on special inducements meant
that the violator was “operating an illegal gambling busi-
ness in violation of the law of this state,” which violated
RICO.105
f. South Carolina Code §§ 32-1-10 and 32-1-20106 did not
provide the exclusive remedy for gambling losses and did
not limit the other remedies to the 90-day limitation on
these two sections.
g. The Defendants’ payment of cash above the statutory cap
and related practices constituted unfair trade practices
under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.107
The practical effect of this South Carolina case was that
“[a]ddicted video poker gamblers, whose lawsuit helped topple a
$3 billion industry, got a chance . . . to win back up to three times
the money they poured into gaming machines.”108  At gambling’s
peak in the mid-1990s, South Carolina “had about 37,000 ma-
100 Johnson , 564 S.E.2d at 658.
101 Id.  at 658 (interpreting S.C. CODE § 12-21-2804(B) (repealed 1999)).  The
Court interpreted an advertising ban as it interfaced with the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.
102 Id.  at 660-61 (interpreting S.C. CODE §§ 12-21-2791, 12-21-2804(B) (repealed
1999)).
103 Id.  at 661-62 (interpreting S.C. CODE §§ 12-21-2791, 12-21-2804(B) (repealed
1999)).
104 Id.  at 663 (interpreting S.C. CODE § 12-21-2804(F) (repealed 1999)).
105 Id.  at 663-64 (interpreting S.C. CODE §§ 12-21-2770 to 12-21-2809 (repealed
1999)).
106 Johnson , 564 S.E.2d at 663-64 (interpreting S.C. CODE §§ 32-1-10, 32-1-20, 39-
5-10 et seq.  (Law Co-op. 1991)).  The relevant sections were originally adopted as
part of the Statute of Anne enacted in 1710.  An Act for the Better Preventing of
Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, 1710, 9 Ann. c. 14, §§ 1, 2, 4 (England). See also
S.C. CODE §§ 12-21-2770 to 12-21-2809 (repealed 1999).
107 Johnson , 564 S.E.2d at 665-66 (interpreting S.C. CODE §§ 39-5-10 et seq.  (Law
Co-op 1991)).
108 Clif LeBlanc, Ruling Says Gamblers Could Recoup Losses, More , STATE (Co-
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chines that grossed an average of up to $25,000 each.”109  How-
ever, the South Carolina Supreme Court de jure “banned video
poker effective July 1, 2000, and stopped a referendum that
might have allowed the gaming industry to stay alive.”110  In
Johnson , the supreme court held that “video poker operators ran
their legal gambling operations illegally.”111  The decision con-
cluded that the video gambling “operators offered jackpots that
far exceeded the state payout cap of $125; violated fair trade
practices[;] and did it in a way that could amount to criminal
racketeering.”112  Plaintiffs’ attorney Richard Gergel cautioned
that “the ruling takes the gamblers’ position so completely that it
warns anyone who gets into the gambling business that they must
abide by the letter of the law.”113  Charleston attorney Larry
Richter, a 2002 candidate for the state attorney general, indicated
that plaintiffs would pursue the assets of the video poker compa-
nies as well as the owners’ personal wealth—several of whom
became millionaires.114
E. Follow Administrative Judicial Rulings on Expert Testimony
Resolving Issues in Pathological Gambling
Prior to the recriminalization of electronic gambling devices
and the video gambling machines in South Carolina, a 1998 ad-
ministrative judge’s ruling on pathological gambling issues was
illuminating.115  After evaluating expert testimony on several de-
bated issues, the judge ruled:
I find the following attributes exist concerning gambling in so-
ciety.  Pathological gambling, the clinical term used to describe
compulsive gamblers, is a very disruptive illness that occurs in
some individuals who choose to gamble.  The increase of the
legalization of various forms of gambling increases the occur-
rence of pathological gambling in society.  Various direct and
indirect economic and social costs accompany pathological
gambling, including crime, loss of productivity, broken homes,
lumbia, S.C.), May 29, 2002, at 1, available at  2002 WL 18743184 [hereinafter Gam-
blers Could Recoup].
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See , e.g. , Public Hearing Report of the Administrative Law Judge in re:  Pro-
posed Regulations §§ 12-21-2720(A)(3),  12-21-2804 S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, Doc.
No. 97-ALJ-17-0589-RH (Apr. 28, 1998).
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bankruptcy, etc.  In fact, pathological gambling affects the en-
tire society, in the work environment and the family environ-
ment.  Specifically, there is a strong relationship between
compulsive gambling and crime.  Money is the substance of
the pathological gambling addiction.  Once the compulsive
gambler exhausts all legal access to money, he routinely com-
mits crimes to get money.  Thus the greater the prevalence of
gambling, the greater the prevalence of crime.  Consequently,
the reduction of gambling reduces the potential for pathologi-
cal gambling, and the resulting amount of social harm.116
This administrative judge’s ruling was insightful, and it answered
many questions contrary to the public relations dogma of pro-
gambling interests.  This ruling was also significant since it was
issued over a year before the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission’s
Final Report117 and the Executive Summary ,118 which largely
confirmed the judge’s conclusions.
F. Question:  What Constitutes a “Fair Game” When the Pro-
Gambling Interests Can Legislate the Definition of the
Term “Fair”?
The main problem with the decriminalization of gambling in
the United States during the 1980s and 1990s was that it was
decriminalized and then supposedly regulated by pro-gambling
interests—an inherent conflict of interest.  During the 1990s, sev-
eral states decriminalized casino gambling119 and modeled their
regulations on legislation drafted by pro-gambling interests in-
cluding what constituted a “fair game.”  Kansas City attorney
Stephen Bradley Small summarized the problems in 2000:
The fundamental problem with suing a casino is that the courts
appear unwilling to get involved—as if by walking into a ca-
sino you are asking to be robbed. . . . The state’s rules say the
games must be fair.  The games are not fair, so this is an area
ripe for litigation.120
In 2003, Small brought the “fairness” issues into the public spot-
116 Id.
117 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77.
118 NGISC EXEC. SUMMARY, supra  note 77.
119 Other than Nevada (1931) and New Jersey (in Atlantic City, 1976), the first
state to allow non-Indian casinos was South Dakota (in Deadwood, 1989).  In 1989,
riverboat casinos were authorized first in Iowa and then in Illinois.  George G.
Fenich, A Chronology of (Legal) Gaming in the U.S. , 3 GAMING RES. & REV. J. 65,
70, 72, 74 (1996) [hereinafter Chronology of (Legal) Gaming].
120 Self-Exclusion , supra  note 15.
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light in State ex rel. Small v. Ameristar .121
As indicated in the previous analysis, practically all, if not all,
games developed by the gambling industry have a built-in statis-
tical edge for “the House” (i.e. , the House Advantage) which
means that over time the House will always win the money wa-
gered—a principle known as “gambler’s ruin.”122  By definition,
the games are designed as “zero-sum” games to leave the gam-
bler with “zero” and the house with the “sum” of all the money
wagered.  Over time, this will always occur.  Statistically, a gam-
bler thus only can come out ahead if the gambler has a short-
term positive cash “win”—and then never gambles again.  Con-
tinued gambling can statistically only lead to “gambler’s ruin.”
These scenarios raised the strategic issues of “fairness”:  Were
the states with legalized gambling really giving each of their citi-
zens an equitable or fair chance to have an ultimate gambling
win?  The gambler’s ruin principle suggested that the states were
not.  In other words, statistics indicated that anyone who could
be enticed to play would be a loser.  In this context, another issue
querried whether U.S. government-licensed gambling was consti-
tutional if its net effect was to mislead people into losing their
property and thereby deprive them of their Fourteenth Amend-
ment property “without due process of law?” A fortiori , how
could state gambling statutes and regulations drafted and/or
dominated by pro-gambling interests comply with due process of
law when by definition all legalized gambling (except parimutual
wagering) is designed to transfer citizens’ property to the House
(in partnership with state governments) as a zero-sum game?
These scenarios also raised individualized issues of “fairness”:
Were the states with legalized gambling really monitoring the
fairness of individualized games or were the states deferring to
determinations of “fairness” as formulated by the Nevada gam-
ing interests?
Scenarios which exemplified individualized complaints in-
volved the ability of gambling venues to change the “House Ad-
vantage” or odds on various electronic gambling machines, all
known as sucker machines for sucker bets.123  The House Advan-
121 State ex rel.  Small v. Ameristar Casino Kan. City, Inc., No. CV103-3190CC
(Cir. Ct., Clay Co., Mo. May 12, 2003).  This case blueprints several causes of action
in these issue areas.
122 See supra  notes 86-93 & accompanying text. See generally Free Credit , supra
note 10.
123 Although such manipulation generally would be illegal, technologically the
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tage could range from one to ten percent (or higher) on VGMs.
By comparison, the House Advantage in blackjack or baccarat
was one percent—but only if the player played optimum strate-
gies (without any sucker bets).
The 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission suggested throughout its
Final Report  that states with legalized gambling relied to their
detriment, and the detriment of their citizens, on the advice and
regulatory schema of pro-gambling interests.124  Accordingly, by
the early twenty-first century, citizens began bringing lawsuits
challenging the state regulatory mechanisms themselves, such as
Small , which plaintiffs brought in part on behalf of the general
public. Small  raised issues involving fairness and an allegedly de-
fective slot machine.125  The lawsuit claimed “the casino and the
state gaming commission . . . knowingly allowed a defective slot
machine to continue to operate.”126  The questionable machine
was a double $1 slot produced by International Game
Technology.127
For the first time, a judge (not a gambling agent) ordered a
VGM “pulled off the floor” of a casino, and attorney “Small also
implied that the [casino’s] other 3,000 [VGMs were] at risk.”128
These VGMs appeared to be particularly vulnerable to such chal-
lenges because by the late 1990s VGMs accounted for seventy to
ninety percent of casino revenues129 and were static play ma-
“owner [of a video gambling machine] can flip an internal switch to change the odds
and make it almost impossible to win.”  Virginia Young, Kids’ Amusement Games
Run Afoul of Gaming Laws , ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 2, 1999, at B1, availa-
ble at  1999 WL 3013375.  The House Advantage on VGMs interfaces with the adver-
tising of “the loosest slots.”  For a discussion of slot machine payout percentages, see
Fred Faust, Casinos Here Differ on Just What Makes a Loose Slot Machine Loose ,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 23, 1998, at BP2, available at  1998 WL 3321726.
The profit margin on video gambling machines is so large that they typically pay for
themselves within two weeks of being installed.  Even so, the temptations and appar-
ent ease with which the VGMs can be fixed have led to high-profile cases. See , e.g. ,
Peter O’Connell, Pair Sentenced for Roles in Killing of Witness in Slot-Rigging Case ,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 22. 1999, at 1B, available at  1999 WL 9300741. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
124 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77.
125 Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint, Small , No. CV103-3190CC (filed May 12,
2003).
126 Judge Orders Slot Machine Pulled From Ameristar Casino , KMBC-TV, May
12, 2003, at  http://www.thekansascitychannel.com/news/2198782/details.html [here-
inafter Judge Orders Slot Machine Pulled]; Small , No. CV103-3190CC (granting
temporary restraining order).
127 Judge Orders Slot Machine Pulled , supra  note 126.
128 Id. ; see Small , No. CV103-3190CC (granting temporary restraining order).
129 See supra  notes 77-79, 123 and accompanying text.
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chines controlled by the gambling industry’s various VGM chips,
allegedly involving no valid “skills” for general play.130
The Small  complaint raised numerous allegations relating to
individualized “fairness” and even to improprieties.  Most of the
allegations in the complaint were directed to issues involving the
networking between centralized computer systems, video gam-
bling machines, and the “chips” driving the VGMs:
One particular chip . . . [allegedly] permits cheating and steal-
ing through the entry of a sequence of player activated button
pushes.  When this occurs, the machine empties its hopper and
consequently reflects that it has “paid out” a higher number of
coins than actually has occurred.  This chip has existed in the
thousands of . . . slot machines at [various casinos].131
The allegations were supported by multiple citations to the “pat-
ents” for chips formulated to perform specialized functions.132
Furthermore, the complaint alleged:
The slot machine as all other . . . [various] slot and video poker
machines are networked through communication links to cen-
tral computer processing equipment. . . .
All game data is communicated between a gaming machine
and the central computer.  Pursuant to the . . . [jackpot sys-
tem], the gaming machine requests and central computer[s]
periodically communicate packets of game/prize information
to the slot machines.  As these packets of information are de-
pleted by wagering activity, additional packets of information
are requested by the machine and transmitted from the . . .
computer suite.  The content of the packets are win/loss and
jackpot prize instructions.  Most if not potentially all of the
stacks and sub stacks of packets can be preset by the casino to
contain no winning progressive jackpot.  Through this method-
ology the casino can assure that jackpots are not awarded for
the indefinite future.  The casino can also dispense a packet
with a jackpot winning instruction to a particular machine to
force a jackpot to be awarded to a particular player at a prede-
termined time.  The casino can also take the slot machine in
question off line to prevent it from receiving large prize award
130 Id.  “Although state laws mandate that winning at slots be based only on luck
and chance, many players’ [false] sense that skill makes a difference goes a long way
toward explaining the phenomenal popularity of video poker. . . . ‘The illusion that
player participation makes a difference’ in the outcome drives which slot machines
get players,” according to Whittier Law Professor I. Nelson Rose. Gambling’s ‘Holy
Grail’ Slot Addictive Game , supra  note 79.  The U.S. rule defines a “game of
chance” as a game where chance predominately controls  the outcome. See , e.g. ,
Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co., 508 S.E.2d 575 (S.C. 1998).
131 Plaintiffs Class Action Complaint at para. 6, Small , No. CV103-3190CC.
132 See , e.g. , U.S. Patent No. 5,779,545 (issued July 14, 1998); Plaintiff’s Class Ac-
tion Complaint at para. 7, Small , No. CV103-3190CC.
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instructions. . . . [Missouri Gaming Commission] regulations
require maintenance of all communications with gaming ma-
chines.  Through this communications system, the casino can
manage the timing and location of jackpots as well as to whom
the jackpots are awarded and maximize its return (as well as
progressive financial losses to players, some of which may or
can result in devastating damage including personal or finan-
cial ruin).  Through this system the casino can also systemati-
cally win money from any given individual or plurality of
players, most particularly those it has targeted [particularly via
Customer Cards].  The casino can also award jackpots or other
prizes to selected players including potentially its
confederates.133
While none of these allegations were proved in court, this case
highlighted future issue areas.  For example, the potential inter-
state communications systems between various VGMs also raised
spectres of potential violations of the Interstate Wire Act.
In addition, Small could claim that several issues were not ad-
dressed and that the judge’s decision focused only “on testimony
about one of several computer chips” that drove the VGMs.134
A summary of court testimony was revealing:
The Missouri Gaming Commission earlier [in 2003] revoked
the license for that chip after determining that a programming
flaw could allow a player—in collusion with an accomplice
with access to the chip—to cheat the machine by tricking it
into paying excess amounts of jackpot coins.
Commission gaming enforcement manager Clarence
Greeno testified that the programming flaw “had nothing to
do with game outcomes.”
Small, however, argued . . . in court that “this chip cheats
players,” and he insisted that it continues to do so because the
commission has allowed the flawed chip to remain in that lone
machine until its big jackpot is won.135
The court’s narrow focus and the refusal of the court to address
all of the issues raised in the complaint frustrated the plaintiff.
Greeno testified that the casino sought a waiver to continue
using the chip in order not to create a public perception that
its big jackpot game was being manipulated in any way.
When Small attempted to cross-examine Greeno, Mike
Bradley, an assistant attorney general representing the com-
mission, successfully objected and halted Greeno’s testimony
133 Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint at paras. 11-12, Small , No. CV103-3190CC.
134 Rick Alm, Judge Puts Ameristar Slot Machine Back in Action , KAN. CITY
STAR, May 16, 2003, at C2, available at  2003 WL 19781772.
135 Id.
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before it could become a matter of public record.136
The judge ruled that the slot machine at issue could be returned
to the floor of the casino.137  Although this did not establish pre-
cedent, some of the issues raised in the fifty-page complaint high-
lighted the vulnerability of casinos’ computer networks and
became a blueprint for future causes of action.
Accordingly, gambling facilities appear to be vulnerable to
lawsuits in these issue areas.  Even so, plaintiffs’ attorneys pur-
sued other issue areas more aggressively as the twenty-first cen-
tury began.
III
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Legalize It in Nevada and Eventually It Will Be Legal
Everywhere:  Is Las Vegas the Nation’s
Shadow Capitol?
As destructive social and economic policy, gambling was not
only criminalized throughout the United States for most of the
twentieth century, but also “successfully criminalized.”  In 1931,
casino gambling was decriminalized in Nevada,138 and in 1976,
casino gambling was voted into Atlantic City, New Jersey, after
failing in 1974.139  Beginning in 1988, both tribal and commercial
casino gambling were not approved by votes in public referen-
dum but were created by legislative fiat via casino lobbyists until
thirty states had casinos by 2002.  Until 2002, the two major ex-
ceptions with statewide public votes on casino gambling were
1988 in Deadwood, South Dakota, for limited mini-casinos140
and 1996 in Detroit (after three previous rejections by voters).141
With Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer “serving as a sort of crou-
pier,”142 different groups including one headed by former Detroit
Mayor Coleman Young maneuvered for the Detroit licenses.143
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Chronology of (Legal) Gaming , supra  note 119, at 70.
139 Id.  at 72.
140 See , e.g. , Economic Impacts , supra  note 54, at 70-75.
141 George Weeks, Young Enters Race for Casino , DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 21, 1997,
at A1; New Wheels for Motor City , ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1998, at 23, available at
1998 WL 8884781 [hereinafter New Wheels for Motor City].
142 New Wheels for Motor City , supra  note 141.
143 Adam Steinhauer, Gaming’s New Frontier , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 18, 1997,
at 1D, available at  1997 WL 4551150.
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Thus, within a decade there were thirty new casino states with
approximately 800 casinos and bingo facilities, both tribal and
non-tribal.144  Furthermore, the first U.S. lottery in New Hamp-
shire in 1964 had spread during the 1980s to include thirty-eight
states (plus Washington, D.C.) with lotteries by 2003.145
While these trends toward decriminalizing gambling started
slowly, they gained momentum during the 1990s.  It also became
apparent that Nevada legislation and regulations, drafted by the
gambling industry or heavily influenced by the industry, were be-
ing utilized as models for gambling expansions into other states.
By the end of the 1990s, Nevada legislation was not just the
model; it set the agenda for U.S. gambling expansion.
One example included Nevada’s legalization of sports gam-
bling, which was at first rubber-stamped by Washington, D.C.,
via a federal legislative Nevada “exception” in the Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992.146  However, the ex-
ception was soon manipulated to make the rule nationally.147
Other examples were gambling via the Internet or other cyber-
space venues, which were illegal under the Interstate Wire
Act.148  To leverage Washington, D.C., into de facto, if not de
jure, legalization of Internet gambling, Nevada legislators tried to
legalize their own Internet gambling.
It won’t come as a surprise . . . to learn that Nevada casinos
usually get what they want from our state lawmakers.  Thus,
when high-powered casino lobbyist Harvey Whittemore asked
the 2001 State Legislature for an Internet gambling bill, our
elected representatives gave him and his wealthy clients what
they wanted.149
144 Dave Palermo, Playing the Numbers Game , INT’L GAMING & WAGERING
BUS., June 2002, at 22 [hereinafter Playing the Numbers Game] (approximately 750
casinos/gambling parlors, and 37 states with lotteries); U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf (R),
Column, Most Indians Still Mired in Poverty , DAY (New London, Conn.), Oct. 26,
2003, at C3, (approximately 800 casinos/gambling facilities) reported at  Peace Party,
http://www.bluecorncomics.com/stype3a.htm [hereinafter Indians Still Mired in
Poverty].
145 Playing the Numbers Game , supra  note 144, at 22; Indians Still Mired in Pov-
erty , supra  note 144, at C3.
146 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04 (1994).
147 John Warren Kindt & Thomas Asmar, College and Amateur Sports Gambling:
Gambling Away Our Youth? , 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221, 231-32 (2002) [herein-
after Gambling Away Our Youth].
148 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994). See also Gambling Away Our Youth , supra  note 147,
at 232-33.
149 Guy W. Farmer, Column, Internet Gaming, a Losing Proposition , NEV. AP-
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Even members of the Nevada press were outraged.  “Following
last-minute passage of this flawed piece of legislation, . . . politi-
cal columnist Jon Ralston accused lawmakers of acting like ‘a 63-
member rubber-stamping board of trustees for the Nevada Re-
sort Association.’”150
In a parallel scenario, in 1998 federal prosecutors indicted sev-
eral U.S. “business” persons operating six on-line gambling facili-
ties based outside the United States.151  One high-profile
provider of Internet gambling services and a San Francisco resi-
dent, Jay Cohen, surrendered to federal authorities for trial in
New York.152
Cohen, co-owner of a popular gaming Web site based on the
tiny island of Antigua, was convicted [in 2000] in New York
federal court of violating the 40-year-old Interstate Wire Act,
which bans companies and individuals from using interstate
phone lines to take bets.  Cohen, who was sentenced to 21
months in prison and fined $5,000, . . . appealed his conviction
to the U.S. Supreme Court on grounds that his customers’ wa-
gers took place in Antigua rather than in the U.S.153
Cohen lost his appeal and began serving his sentence in 2001.154
By comparison, several of the twenty-one other indicted individ-
uals did not immediately surrender to U.S. authorities and re-
mained fugitives.155
Just as Nevada interests had spread gambling throughout the
United States during the 1990s, critics noted that the Shadow
Capitol was politically market-testing the legalization and spread
PEAL (Carson City, Nev.), Apr. 7, 2002, available at  http://www.nevadaappeal. com
[hereinafter Losing Proposition].
150 Id.
151 Dean Starxman, U.S. Indicts 14 Over Gambling On the Internet , WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 5, 1998, at A8, available at  1998 WL 3485072.
152 Id. ; Larry Neumeister, FBI Charges 14 Individuals in Six Companies with Con-
spiracy , ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 4, 1998, available at  1998 WL 6643890.
153 Losing Proposition , supra  note 149.
154 United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2001); Larry Neumeister, Appeals
Court Upholds Conviction of Web Sports Gambling Defendant , ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRE, July 31, 2001, available at  WL, Allnewplus; U.S. Wins First Offshore
Internet Gambling Case , REUTERS LTD., March 9, 2000, reprinted at  Search-
Dice.com, http://www.searchdice.com/Magazine/Business/Articles/78801.html [here-
inafter Offshore Gambling].
155 Offshore Gambling , supra  note 154. See generally , John Warren Kindt & Ste-
phen W. Joy, Internet Gambling and the Destabilization of National and Interna-
tional Economies:  Time for a Comprehensive Ban on Gambling Over the World
Wide Web , 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 111 (2002) [hereinafter Gambling’s Destabilization
of Economies].
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of drugs and prostitution as the new saviors for state budgets.156
However, critics opined that the most blatant example of the in-
fluence of the Las Vegas Shadow Capitol was its direct influence
on the U.S. Congress in the $100 billion Economic Stimulus Bill
of 2002.157  While few tax credits were allowed to consumer or
product-oriented companies, the gambling companies received a
tax write-off slipped into the bill by the House Gaming Caucus
and worth a reported $40 billion in write-offs for “slot machines”
and associated technical equipment.158
B. Legalizing More Gambling Activities Increases Illegal
Gambling and Associated Crime:  Existing Gambling
Facilities Attract Criminals
Illegal sports wagers in the United States totaled an estimated
$8 billion in 1983 and grew to $29 billion in 1990.159  In another
estimate, U.S. illegal sports betting was placed at $100 billion in
1992 and exceeded the $80 billion narcotics business.160  In 1996,
a trade magazine for the gambling industry referenced the Coun-
156 See , e.g. , Charlie LeDuff, Nevada Turns to Brothels as a Budget Fix , N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2003, at A7, available at  LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All
(English, Full Text).
157 Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116
Stat. 21 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (commonly
referred to as the 2002 Economic Stimulus Bill). See also  John Warren Kindt &
Anne E.C. Brynn, Destructive Economic Policies in the Age of Terrorism:  Govern-
ment-Sanctioned Gambling as Encouraging Transboundary Economic Raiding and
Destabilizing National and International Economies , 16 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J.
243 (2002) [hereinafter Gambling Destabilizing Economies].
158 See  Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act, supra  note 157; Tony Batt, Tax
Break for Slots OK’d:  Measure Will Let Companies Deduct Technological Expenses ,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 16, 2001, at 10D, available at  2001 WL 9541525. See gener-
ally , John Warren Kindt, Would Re-Criminalizing U.S. Gambling Pump-Prime the
Economy and Could U.S. Gambling Facilities Be Transformed into Educational and
High-Tech Facilities?  Will the Legal Discovery of Gambling Companies’ Secrets
Confirm Research Issues? , 8 STANFORD J.L., BUS. & FIN. 169 (2003) [hereinafter
Gambling Facilities Transformed into Educational Facilities ]; John Warren Kindt, In-
ternationally, The 21st Century Is No Time for the United States to Be Gambling with
the Economy:  Taxpayers Subsidizing the Gambling Industry and the De Facto Elimi-
nation of All Casino Tax Revenues via the 2002 Economic Stimulus Act , 29 OHIO N.
UNIV. L. REV. 363 (2003) [hereinafter Gambling with the Economy and the Elimina-
tion of All Casino Tax Revenues].
159 Paul Doocey, The Case for Legal Sports Betting , INT’L GAMING & WAGERING
BUS., Apr. 1996, at 1, 42 (citing to estimates from Christiansen/Cum-mings Associ-
ates, Inc.) [hereinafter Case for Sports Betting].
160 James Cook, “If Roxborough Says the Spread Is 7, It’s 7” , FORBES, Sept. 14,
1992, at 350, 351, available at  1992 WL 3066694 [hereinafter The Spread].
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cil on Compulsive Gambling,161 estimating that the U.S. illegal
sports gambling was $88 billion of a total $125 billion in illegal
U.S. wagers.162  In 1995, legalized sports betting was merely $2.6
billion in the only state where it was legalized, i.e., Nevada.163
These numbers were within acceptable ranges for the Nevada
Attorney General’s Office, which posited in 1997 that there was
a problem with illegal U.S. gambling.164  While the gambling in-
dustry frequently argued that legalizing gambling activities de-
creased illegal gambling, the opposite trend was occurring—the
legalization of U.S. gambling activities was increasing illegal
gambling and associated crime, and according to the FBI’s fugi-
tive apprehension program, existing gambling facilities attract
criminals (with Las Vegas at number one).165
Furthermore, organized crime controlled much of the illegal
bookmaking activities.166  A national system of layoff betting was
controlled and maintained by such crime families as the Chicago
crime syndicate, the New England crime syndicate, and the Gam-
bino and Genovese crime syndicates in New York.167
Both legal and illegal sports gambling has ensnared and trans-
formed substantial numbers of the U.S. public, including teenag-
ers and collegiates, into pathological and problem gamblers.
According to one estimate, 4% of all adults and 7% of all
teenagers [in 1992 were pathological] gamblers—degenerates,
as the gambling fraternity calls them—and the numbers are
growing rapidly.  There are some prominent victims among
them, ranging from baseball’s Pete Rose and football’s Art
Schlichter (both suspended for life from their sports leagues)
to ABC Sports’ former director Chet Forte (who lost his job
161 The article did not indicate whether it meant the national or Nevada council.
162 Case for Sports Betting , supra  note 159, at 40.
163 Id.
164 Nev. Att’y Generals Off., Analysis (1997) (on file with Nev. Att’y General’s
Off.).
165 John M. Glionna, Fugitives Roll Dice on Vegas , L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at
A1, available at  1999 WL 26194263, reprinted as  John M. Glionna, Vegas:  Where
Crooks Gamble on Escape , ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at A13 [hereinafter
Vegas:  Where Crooks Gamble on Escape]; Lex Varria, Column, They’re All of a
Kind , OREGONIAN (Portland, Ore.), Apr. 25, 1997, at D11, available at  1997 WL
4166854 [hereinafter They’re All of a Kind]. See generally , Robert Dorr, Ex-Mob
Insider Says Betting Does Harm , OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Dec. 10, 1996, at 13,
available at  1996 WL 6041759; Bill O’Brien, Gambling Foes Demand Voters’ Voices
Be Heard , DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.), Mar. 17, 1997, at A1, available
at  http://archives.dailyherald.com.
166 Id.
167 See , e.g. , The Spread , supra  note 160, at 350.
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and his career) to the degenerate don himself, John Gotti, who
used to plunder his own sports books with his profligate
betting.168
These numbers were still within the estimated ranges of the per-
centages of pathological and problem gamblers in the U.S. public
in 2003, and they paralleled numbers in the Final Report  of the
1999 U.S. Gambling Commission.169  Highlighting the problem of
gambling among collegiates, NCAA Executive Director Cedric
Dempsey complained:  “We know every institution in this coun-
try has student bookies, tied directly or indirectly to organized
crime.”170  By 1998 more of the news media outlets were report-
ing that the costs to taxpayers associated with legalized gambling
activities outweighed any benefits.171
Pro-gambling interests claimed that legalizing gambling activi-
ties, such as sports gambling and casino gambling, would de-
crease illegal gambling activities via regulating gambling.  Ergo,
pro-gambling interests also argued, for example, that legalizing
illegal gambling machines would decrease illegal gambling be-
cause that illegal gambling would no longer be a crime.  How-
ever, trends throughout the 1980s and 1990s clearly indicate that
legalizing gambling activities increased illegal gambling activities
and associated crime.  News stories featured headlines such as
Ex-Mobster Says Legalized Gambling Brings in the Mob ,172
based on congressional testimony from nationally recognized ex-
168 Id.  at 354.
169 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, at p. 4-6 tbl.4-2.  For summaries of the
numbers of pathological gamblers and the associated costs from gamblers’ addictive
behaviors, bankruptcies, and crime, see Mega-Lawsuits , supra  note 1, at 44-63
tbls.A1-14. See also Gambling Away Our Youth , supra  note 147; John Warren Kindt
& John K. Palchak, Legalized Gambling’s Destablization of U.S. Financial Institu-
tions and the Banking Industry , 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 21, 26-29 (2002); John Warren
Kindt, Diminishing or Negating the Multiplier Effect:  The Transfer of Consumer
Dollars to Legalized Gambling , 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 281, 312-13 [hereinaf-
ter Gambling’s Crime Multiplier Effect]; Gambling with the Economy and the Elimi-
nation of All Casino Tax Revenues , supra  note 158, at 367-69, 388-89.
170 Robyn Norwood, NCAA Knows This Is Tough To Fix , L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1998, at C1, available at  1998 WL 2412360.
171 See , e.g. , Editorial, Counties Losing Out:  Despite Receiving Few Benefits,
Counties with Indian Casinos Experience Higher Social Costs , TOPEKA CAP.-J., Apr.
28, 1998, available at  LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All (English, Full
Text). See also  John Warren Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities as Subsidized by
Taxpayers , 48 ARK. L. REV. 889 (1995) [hereinafter Gambling Subsidized by Tax-
payers]. See generally , Case for Sports Betting , supra  note 159, at 1. Contra Gam-
bling Away Our Youth , supra  note 147, at 221.
172 Christine A. Verstraete, Ex-Mobster Says Legalized Gambling Brings in the
Mob , KENOSHA NEWS, Oct. 2, 1998, at A6.
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mobster William Jahoda.173
As U.S. gambling activities were decriminalized during the
1980s and 1990s, regulations at first curbed overt abuses, but the
regulatory schemes were largely ineffective in removing inappro-
priate activities and all organized crime influences.174  In 1995
173 See , e.g. , Nat’l Gambling Impact & Policy Comm’n Act of 1995:  Hearing on
H.R. 497 before the House Comm. on the Judiciary , 104th Cong. 60-61 (1995) (state-
ment of William Jahoda) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995].
174 See  John Warren Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effec-
tively:  Incentives for Perpetual Non-Compliance , 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 219 (2003). See
also Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling , supra  note 52.  In California, for
example, the head of the Attorney General’s Division of Gambling Control and
other superiors were even accused by four former employees of “routinely
quash[ing] investigations into suspected corruption, embezzlement, and theft at In-
dian casinos . . . with the result being that millions of dollars of taxpayer money
[was] basically ‘looted’ by corruption in the casinos.”  Onell R. Soto, Agents say
Indian casino probes stymied , SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 10, 2003 [hereinafter
Indian Casino Probes Stymied] , available at  http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/
uniontrib/fri/news/news_1n26indians.html.  The head of the California Division of
Gambling Control, Harlan Goodson, relinquished his post during the summer of
2003 and went to work for a Las Vegas law firm, which critics cited as another exam-
ple of the “revolving door” of regulators going to work for the regulated. Indian
Casino Probes Stymied , supra  (Goodson did not return calls from the press.)  By
comparison, when Philip C. Parenti the administrator to the Illinois Gaming Board
resigned to take a job with Harrah’s casino company, Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich promptly “fired” him—rather than allow him to collect several weeks
salary as a de facto job transition bonus.  Assoc. Press, Gaming Board may change
conduct code , NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign, IL), July 19, 2003, at B4.
A pattern of “revolving door” incidents in Illinois exemplified the continuing reg-
ulatory problems throughout the United States.  After only a few weeks as a regula-
tor beginning in 2001, “Thomas F. Swoik quit his job at the Illinois Gaming Board
[and] began a part-time job representing gambling interests as executive director of
the Illinois Casino Gaming Association.  Swoik’s current move has enraged gam-
bling opponents and government watchdogs, who want the Gaming Board to bar
such moves.”  Assoc. Press, Former Casino Regulator Gets New Job:  Move To Gam-
bling Association Angers Opponents, Watchdogs, ST. J.-REG.  (Springfield, Ill.), Apr.
4, 2002, at 11.  The fact that Swoik took over the Illinois casino “association so
quickly after leaving the Gaming Board raise[d] suspicions about cozy relationships
between casinos and board staff.” Id.  at 11.  There had been multiple prior incidents
of the Illinois “revolving door.”
Swoik isn’t the first person to leave the Gaming Board to work in the in-
dustry.  Its first administrator, attorney William Kunkle, has represented
several casino groups, including Emerald Casino Inc., which is fighting to
open a casino in Rosemont.  Former acting administrator Joseph McQuaid
is Emerald’s vice president.  And Donna More, a former board legal coun-
sel, is a regular at board meetings, representing multiple casinos.
Id.  at 11.
For a classic article on the problem of the “revolving door” in the regulation of
gambling, see Brett Pulley, From Gambling’s Regulators to Casinos’ Men , N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998, at A1.  To solve the problem of the regulatory revolving door,
the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission recommended a one-year
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congressional hearings, gambling opponents argued persuasively
that the spread of legalized gambling activities would increase
the opportunities for organized crime.175  Throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, organized crime’s infiltration into tribal gambling in-
creased as tribal gambling facilities spread.176  In commercial
gambling facilities, state regulation was not effective.  For exam-
hiatus before a gambling regulator could become a gambling industry employee,
which was a common standard in other industries such as the defense industry, but
states basically ignored this ethical standard, giving a free pass to gambling compa-
nies. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, rec. 3.17, at p. 3-19.  The federal gov-
ernment also ignored the one-year safeguard.  Furthermore, top government talent
was migrating to employment in the gambling industry.  For example, after just three
months on the job, the “FBI’s top counterterrorism official announced his retire-
ment [in 2003] . . . to take a top security job for a large casino firm in Las Vegas . . .
controlled by casino magnate Steve Wynn.”  Dan Eggen, Top FBI Counterterror Of-
ficial Announces Retirement , WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2003, at A11.  For a review of
issues involving the interface between gambling and terrorism, see Gambling Dest-
ablizing Economies , supra  note 157; Gambling’s Destabilization of Economies ,
supra  note 155.
Political contributions from the gambling industry to elected officials also drew
fire from the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission which called for
“tight restrictions” and a gambling “industry-specific contribution restriction in par-
ticular.” NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, rec. 3.5, at p. 3-18.  For specific
examples of issues involving campaign contributions and its interface with the gam-
bling industry, see John W. Kindt, Follow the Money:  Gambling, Ethics, and Sub-
poenas , 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD., POL. & SOC. SCI. 85 (1998) [hereinafter Follow the
Money]; Chris Fusco & Graham Buck, Gambling Industry Rewards Stephens with
$96,000 , DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.), Feb. 3, 2000, at 5 (criticizing
Mayor Donald E. Stephens, of Rosemont, Illinois); James Webb, New Gambling
Regulators Listed as GOP Fund-Raisers , ST. J. REG. (Springfield, Ill.), July 29, 1999,
at 3.
In one well-known case in Louisiana, U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu was elected by
pro-gambling interests allegedly campaigning with inappropriate methods.
As midafternoon exit polls on [Nov. 5, 1996] showed a clear advantage for
Woody Jenkins to become Louisiana’s first Republican senator in [the
twentieth] century, Democrats advised [that] . . . [g]ambling interests would
save Democratic candidate Mary Landrieu with a late burst of activity
bringing out African-American voters. . . . Allegations that this frantic
surge included non-voters and dead voters led to a Republican legal
challenge . . .
There was also a fraud complaint to the U.S. Senate, both of which were later
dropped due to evidentiary time constraints.  Robert Novak, Column, In Louisiana
Gamblers Got Their Woman , ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Nov. 19, 1996, at 6.
175 See , e.g. , Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 , supra  note 173, at 60-61. See
also , Indians Still Mired in Poverty , supra  note 144; Vegas:  Where Crooks Gamble
on Escape , supra  note 165.
176 See , e.g. , James Popkin, Gambling with the Mob?:  Wise Guys Have Set Their
Sights on the Booming Indian Casino Business , U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 23,
1993, at 30, available at  1993 WL 6870574. See also Gambling Facilities Transformed
into Educational Facilities , supra  note 158, at 172-76; Indians Still Mired in Poverty ,
supra  note 144.
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ple, in Illinois, the second state to legalize riverboat casinos in
1992 and to allow them to become land-based in 2000, headlines
were self-explanatory: Expert:  Chicago Mob Would Taint Any
Nearby Casino .177  While the Illinois Gaming Board’s regulations
appeared to work in one instance, they were only effectively en-
forced after scandals and exposure in multiple media outlets.178
In a stinging blow to what once seemed an unstoppable deal,
the Illinois Gaming Board on [January 30, 2001] rejected a
planned Rosemont casino, concluding that top officials of the
would-be riverboat had misled the board and that some inves-
tors had links to mob figures.
“The investigative record establishes the insidious presence
of organized crime elements associated with this proposed
project that cannot be ignored,” Gaming Board Administrator
Sergio Acosta said in a statement to the board.179
In 1999, Law Professor I. Nelson Rose complained that in Cali-
fornia’s Tribal-State Gaming Compact, “[t]here can be no doubt
that the Compact provision [sec. 6.4.4.(c)] was designed to license
felons and members of organized crime.”180  The implications
were not only that tribal gambling interests “wanted” this provi-
sion in the compact but that they also had the power to place it
there.  These scenarios exemplify the lack of de facto regulation
of legalized gambling activities, particularly when the sophisti-
cated legal communities in various states cannot restrain or even
influence the draftsmanship of pro-gambling regulations with im-
pacts allegedly assisting and protecting organized crime figures.
In 2002, Local 69 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Em-
ployees International Union was placed under a court-ordered
monitor “after prosecutors filed a civil complaint accusing union
officials of racketeering.”181  The complaint stated:  “For over
15 years, members and associates of the Genovese crime family
177 Shamus Toomey & Ames Boykin, Expert:  Chicago Mob Would Taint Any
Nearby Casino , DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.), Feb. 1, 2001, at 12, availa-
ble at  http://archives.dailyherald.com. See also  Michael Higgins & Douglas Holt,
Gaming Board Rejects Rosemont Casino Bid , CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2001, § 1, at 1,
available at  2001 WL 4036200 [hereinafter Rejects Rosemont].
178 See , e.g. , Rejects Rosemont , supra  note 177.
179 Id.
180 I. Nelson Rose, Will California license Mobsters? , GAMBLING AND THE LAW
(No. 57) (1999).
181 Amy Westfeldt, Fed Judge Appoints Union Monitor , AP ONLINE, Apr. 17,
2002, available at  2002 WL 19258018, reprinted as  Amy Westfeldt, Feds Seize Culi-
nary Local in N.J. , LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 18, 2002.
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of La Cosa Nostra have exercised influence over Local 69.”182
According to Union General President John W. Wilhelm, how-
ever, “[t]he international union and all of its locals have left these
kinds of problems behind. . . .  We’re not going to permit anyone
to go back to those kinds of practices.”183  U.S. Representative
Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) appointed Wilhelm, while union
president, to serve on the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission.
These problems were exacerbated by the chameleon changes
in organized crime during the 1990s as “investigators continue[d]
to find mob influence on Wall Street, in the penny stock trade
and in the expansion of legalized gaming.”184
C. The “Direct Link” Between Increased Legalized Gambling
Activities and Increased Crime
Throughout the 1990s, in particular as U.S. legalized gambling
spread, prosecutors were indicating that there was a “direct link”
between increased legalized gambling and increased crime.185
Evidence of the direct link between increased crime and gam-
bling was available at the local,186 state,187 and national levels,188
and Kay C. James, the Chair of the 1999 National Gambling Im-
pact Study Commission, confirmed this conclusion.189  During
congressional hearings in 1995, Massachusetts Attorney General
Scott Harshbarger summarized the opinion of the U.S. legal com-
munity regarding legalizing gambling activities:
As president-elect of the National Association of Attorneys
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 John L. Smith, Column, Here Come New Mobs, Not Quite the Same as Old
Mobs , LAS VEGAS REV. J., Jan. 4, 1998, at 1B, available at  1998 WL 7206767.
185 See , e.g. , Marilyn Lewis, Prosecutor Says Crime Rate Linked to Gambling , IN-
LAND VALLEY DAILY BULL. (Ontario, Cal.), Feb. 18, 1995, reprinted in POMONA
CARD CLUB REP. 1 (April 1995).
186 See , e.g. , id. ; Press Release, City of San Jose, Cal., Police Chief Confirms
Councilmembers’ Concerns:  Card Clubs Foster Crime Throughout the City, Mar. 5,
1996 (on file with City of San Jose, Cal.).
187 See , e.g. , J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR., OFFICE MD. ATT’Y GEN., THE HOUSE
NEVER LOSES AND MARYLAND CANNOT WIN:  WHY CASINO GAMBLING IS A BAD
IDEA (1995), available at  http://www.oag.state.md.us/Reports/casinogambling. pdf;
Frank Santiago, Authorities Link Gambling to Cases of Theft , DES MOINES REG.,
Nov. 21, 1997. See also Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling , supra  note 52.
188 See , e.g. , Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 , supra  note 173, at 456-59
(statement of Mass. Att’y Gen. Scott Harshbarger).
189 See , e.g. , Kay C. James, Chair, 1999 Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n,
Speech before the Annual Conf. of the Nat’l Coalition Against Legalized Gambling,
Jackson, Miss., Sept. 26, 1999.
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General, I have had the opportunity to consult with many
other members of the law enforcement community on the ef-
fects of gambling on a city or state.  Overwhelmingly, the re-
sponse has been “Don’t do it.”  Almost every Attorney
General who has faced the issue of casino gambling in their
state has cautioned me that there are a range of public safety,
regulatory, and social issues that are never addressed before
the introduction of gambling.190
Harshbarger noted the link between increased crime and the
spread of legalized gambling activities:
One of the most noted consequences of casino gambling has
been the marked rise in street crime.  Across this nation, po-
lice departments in cities that have casino gambling have re-
corded surges in arrests due to casino-related crime.  In many
cases, towns that had a decreasing crime rate or a low crime
rate have seen a sharp and steady growth of crime once gam-
bling has taken root.191
The Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the state’s
law enforcement community summarized the problems in a 1994
report:
As this report reflects, it has been clearly demonstrated in
other jurisdictions that a significant increase in crime  and its
consequences accompanies casino gambling.  Therefore, the
Florida Sheriffs Association, Florida Police Chiefs Association
and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement are strongly
opposed  to any form of legalized gambling in Florida.192
In supporting its conclusions, the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement noted the “before and after” crime problems that
surfaced after casino gambling was legalized in Atlantic City.
“The well-documented explosion of crime which has been exper-
ienced in the gambling city of Atlantic City, New Jersey is also
telling.”193  Within three years of the advent of casino gambling
in Atlantic City, the city “went from 50th in the nation in per
capita crime to first.”194  Furthermore, “from 1977 to 1990, the
crime rate in that city rose by an incredible 230%.”195
These conclusions still were valid in 2001, and evidence contin-
190 Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 , supra  note 173, at 456 (statement of
Mass. Att’y Gen. Scott Harshbarger).
191 Id.
192 FLA. DEP’T L. ENFORCEMENT ET AL., INCREASED CRIME:  IS IT WORTH THE
GAMBLE? (1994) (emphasis in original).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
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ues to accumulate that legalizing gambling activities causes more
illegal gambling and associated crime.
It is well established that crime rates rise substantially when
gambling is legalized.  Since some communities in Mississippi
legalized casino gambling, their crime rate has increased at
least 800 percent, with rapes increasing 200 percent and rob-
beries 218 percent.  And in 1994, one study showed that com-
munities with gambling had nearly twice the national crime
rate.196
The definitive study on the link between increased crime and le-
galizing casinos was a study by Professors Earl Grinols, David
Mustard, and Cynthia Dilley, which analyzed virtually every ca-
sino community before and after the advent of casinos.197  The
study showed crime increased on average nine percent in the
third year after a casino opened and trended upward
thereafter.198
IV
TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS
A. Attempts to Get the U.S. Gambling Industry to
Acknowledge the Obvious
In 2002, the main trade magazine for the gambling industry,
International Gaming and Wagering Business  (IGWB), cited the
1997 Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis.199  The analysis,200 al-
though funded by the gambling interests themselves,201 showed
the “pathological gambling” rate increased more than 50 percent
in a three-year period—from a base of 0.84 percent in 1977-93 to
1.29 percent in 1994-97.202
196 Tyler J. Jarvis & Heidi Baumann Jarvis, What are the Odds? , BYU MAGAZINE,
Spring 2001, at 49, available at  http://magazine.byu.edu/article.tpl? num=48-Spr01.
197 Earl L. Grinols et al., Casinos And Crime (June 1999) (unpublished draft, on
file with author), forthcoming as  Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, The Curious
Case of Casinos and Crime , ___ REV. ECON. & STAT. ___ (2003) [hereinafter Casi-
nos and Crime].
198 Id.
199 Playing the Numbers Game , supra  note 144, at 22.
200 HOWARD J. SHAFFER ET AL., HARV. MED. SCH., ESTIMATING THE PREVA-
LENCE OF DISORDERED GAMBLING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND CA-
NADA:  A META-ANALYSIS (1997).
201 David Ferrell & Matea Gold, Casino Industry Fights an Emerging Backlash ,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at A1, available at  1998 WL 18903648.
202 Press Release, Harvard Medical School, Harvard Medical School Researchers
Map Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America (Dec. 4, 1997), available
at  http://www.hms.harvard.edu/news/releases/1297gambling.html.
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Even IGWB  noted that the meta-analysis supported “the con-
tention by gambling critics that the proliferation of legal casinos,
lotteries and racetracks not only increases the number of prob-
lem and pathological gamblers, but it raises the prevalence rate,
or the percentage of the adult population with gambling
problems.”203  The IGWB  trade magazine then queried rhetori-
cally:  “What happened in the 1990s to increase the prevalence
rate of gambling addicts?  Legal casino and lottery gambling
spread like wildfire throughout the country.”204  Then, signifi-
cantly, the gambling industry’s own trade magazine castigated
the U.S. gambling industry’s long-held public relations dogma.
But the industry remains in denial.
It defies any study linking gambling with bankruptcy, sui-
cide and other social problems.  And it steadfastly refutes any
claim by critics that the spread of legal casino gambling in this
country increases the prevalence of problem and pathological
gambling.
That position defies logic.  In fact, it’s insulting.
The caseload for specialists in addiction treatment has
skyrocketed when commercial and tribal government casinos
open for business.205
203 Playing the Numbers Game , supra  note 144, at 22.
204 Id.
205 Id.  In 1994, American Medical Association Resolution 430 estimated the
socio-medical costs of gambling at $40 billion per year.  Am. Medical Assoc., House
of Delegates Resolution 430 (A-94) (1994).  Adjusted to 2003 dollars, the AMA’s
estimate would be approximately $70 billion in costs which is more than the entire
revenues derived from U.S. gambling of approximately $65 billion.
In 2003, the Maine Medical Association publicly opposed the siting of a casino
anywhere in the state.  Maine Medical Assoc., Public Health Comm., Resolution
Against Locating a Casino in Maine  (2003).
In 1997, Professor David P. Phillips published a study, Elevated Suicide Levels
Associated with Legalized Gambling , which noted that suicide rates in gambling
communities were two to four times higher than in non-gambling areas with compa-
rable populations.  David P. Phillips, Ward R. Welty, & Marisa Smith, Elevated Sui-
cide Levels Associated with Legalized Gambling , 27 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING
BEHAV. 373 (1997); see  Sandra Blakeslee, Suicide Rate Is Higher In 3 Gambling
Cities , N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at A10.  In 2003 in Ottawa, Canada, “statistics
indicate[d] 126 gambling addicts have killed themselves since 1999, an alarming in-
crease from 27 such suicides in the [previous] five years,” which Canadian experts
attributed to video lottery terminals in bars which were legalized in 1994. Gam-
bling-Related Suicides Soar , LAS VEGAS SUN, Oct. 3, 2003.  Furthermore, a 2003
“investigation by The Canadian Press found more than 10 percent of suicides in
Alberta and more than six percent in Nova Scotia were linked to gambling in 2001,”
which prompted Canadian officials “to standardize the collection of [Canadian] sui-
cide data related to gambling.”  Louise Elliott, Former Copps Coliseum Exec Sue
Ontario , Aug. 24, 2003, available at  http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/ Canada/2003/08/
19/164161-cp.html.  For examples of how U.S. stories linking legalized gambling to
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It was significant that in 2002 the gambling industry’s own
trade magazine, IGWB , was complaining about the industry’s
obfuscation and denial of the academic findings as well as those
of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission.
B. Examples of the Attempts by Pro-Gambling Interests to
Control and Confuse the Information Available to the Public:
The Formation of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission
The 1996 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act
provided that the appointment of its nine commissioners be
made by October 2, 1996, before the November 1996 elections;
however, by March 1997 President Clinton had not yet an-
nounced his three selections.206  Concerns of political posturing
linked to campaign donations and pro-gambling lobbyist activi-
ties were raised by the national press207 and echoed by charities
and public interest groups such as the National Coalition Against
Legalized Gambling (an organization similar to Mothers Against
Drunk Driving).
The Washington Post  highlighted the political interface with
potential Presidential appointments to the Commission:
Start with the guess-who’s-coming-to-coffee list at the White
House.  Last March, for example, one White House coffee
guest was the chairwoman of the Oneida Nation, an Indian
tribe with gambling interests.  On that same day, according to
the Wall Street Journal, the Oneida Nation donated $30,000 to
the Democratic National Committee.  Coffee guest lists show
at least 10 representatives of Indian gambling interests since
mid-1995.208
Furthermore, the Post  was alarmed by other Commission ap-
pointments linked to pro-gambling interests:
One of Speaker Gingrich’s choices is the chairman and CEO
of a Las Vegas casino company [J. Terrence Lanni of MGM
Grand, Inc.].  House Minority Leader Gephardt, who gets one
increased suicides have been supressed, see Stephen Braun, Lives Lost in a River a
Debt , L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1997, at A1.
206 See  Don Feder, Column, Clinton Rolls Dice on Gaming Study , BOSTON HER-
ALD, May 7, 1997, at 31, available at  1997 WL 5399872; see also  James Bennet, Clin-
ton Finally Puts 3 on a Panel to Examine Gambling , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1997, at
A14, available at  LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All (English, Full Text).
207 Editorial, Gambling Payoff? , WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1997, at A18, available at
1997 WL 9334059 [hereinafter Gambling Payoff?]; Warren Richey, Anti-Gambling
Activists Warn of Stacked Commission Deck , CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 21,
1997, at 3, available at  1997 WL 2800006 [hereinafter Stacked Commission Deck].
208 Gambling Payoff? , supra  note 207.
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selection —and whose political committees received at least
$46,500 from gambling interests along with another $4,500
from three women listed as homemakers from Las Vegas—
reportedly favors the head of a union representing casino
employees.209
As anticipated, U.S. Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) later ap-
pointed John W. Wilhelm, general president of the Hotel Em-
ployees and Restaurant Employees International Union.
Established in 1995 under CEO Frank Fahrenkopf, the Ameri-
can Gaming Association [hereinafter AGA] and its lobbying ac-
tivities were scrutinized by the press.
According to lobby registration statements on file in Congress,
Fahrenkopf’s AGA spent $460,000 on lobbying between July
and December 1996.  The forms say one of the two issues the
group worked on was “Establishment of the National Gam-
bling Impact Study Commission.”  Of the $460,000, lobby re-
gistration forms show that $232,000 went to nine outside
lobbyists.210
In 1996, the nine outside lobbyists employed by the AGA in-
cluded:  (1) former U.S. Rep. Dennis Eckart (D-Ohio); (2) Judy
Kern Fazio, wife of U.S. Rep. Vic Fazio (D-Calif.) and former
finance director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee; (3) Steven Champlin, the former director for the
House Democratic Caucus; (4) Kenneth Duberstein, the former
assistant for legislative affairs for President Reagan; and (5)
Donald Fierce, a former aide to Haley Barbour, chair of the Re-
publican National Committee and an initial supporter of the Mis-
sissippi casinos.211
While the selections to the Commission were being made, the
monetary influences of the AGA became a concern voiced by
various charities and public interest groups, such as the
NCALG.212
[T]he $1.9 million in soft-money donations the gambling in-
dustry made to the Democratic Party may be playing a role in
the president’s appointments.  They also cite $232,000 in lob-
bying fees paid to well-connected Washington insiders work-
ing, they say, to influence who is named to the commission.
“If they can stop an objective study it is well worth it to
209 Id.
210 Stacked Commission Deck , supra  note 207.
211 Id.
212 Id.
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them,” says Bernie Horn, NCALG’s political director.213
The AGA rebutted these public concerns:  “These kinds of alle-
gations . . . are disgraceful,” stated Frank Fahrenkopf, a former
chair of the Republican National Committee.  “For the amount
of money that is involved here do you believe you are going to
buy the president of the United States?”214  However, the ap-
pointees to the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission reflected a sig-
nificant influence by pro-gambling interests.
The legislation which established the nine-member Commis-
sion indicated the following legislators (accompanied by their
eventual choices) would choose the commissioners:215
a. Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Newt Ging-
rich (R-Ga.), two choices:  Kay C. James, dean of Regent
University’s School of Government, and J. Terrence
Lanni, chief executive officer of MGM Grand, Inc., a ca-
sino and entertainment company;
b. U.S. House of Representatives Minority Leader Richard
Gephardt (D-Mo.), one choice:  John W. Wilhelm, general
president of the gambling industry’s union, the Hotel Em-
ployees and Restaurant Employees International Union;
c. U.S. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), two
choices:  Paul H. Moore, a Mississippi doctor, and (as cho-
sen by U.S. Sen. Dan Coats (R-Ind.)216) James C. Dobson,
Ph.D., president of Focus on the Family;
d. U.S. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.), one
choice:  Leo T. McCarthy, former California lieutenant
governor for 12 years; and,
e. President William J. Clinton (D), three choices:  William
A. Bible, chair of the Nevada Gaming Control Board;
Robert W. Loescher representing Native American inter-
ests; and Richard C. Leone, former chair of the Port Au-
thority of New York and New Jersey.217
In May 1997, James was appointed Commission chair.218
James described herself as from a minority background,219 and
although she was highly qualified—a former Virginia govern-
ment official, former corporate director, and dean of the Regent
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, at app. II.
216 Dave Berns & Tony Batt, Nevadans Up for Gaming Panel , LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Sept. 7, 1996, at 1A, available at  1996 WL 2348635.
217 See NGLSC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, at app. II.
218 Rick Alm, Study Leader Appointed , KAN. CITY STAR, May 21, 1997, at B1,
available at  1997 WL 3014098 [hereinafter Leader Appointed].
219 Tammie Smith, Kay Cole James , TIMES-DISPATCH (Richmond, Va.), Feb. 6,
2002, at E1, available at  2002 WL 7191281.
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University School of Government220—she was immediately criti-
cized by Fahrenkopf.221  Fahrenkopf continued his criticisms un-
abated throughout the years the Commission was in operation,222
and James did not respond to those criticisms until after the
Commission was completed and issued its Final Report .223
V
POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP
Suits and SLAPP-Back Suits)
In the 1970s and 1980s, industries engaging in initiatives which
generated public debates involving policy were often losing those
debates, such as in the areas of economic development vis-a`-vis
environmental protection.  As a consequence, some industries
began filing what became known as “strategic lawsuits against
public participation”(SLAPP suits),224 lawsuits purportedly de-
signed to stifle, limit, or intimidate public debate on public issues.
After some initial industry successes, First Amendment issues be-
gan to prevail, and many of these suits were dismissed.  Other-
wise, defendants began to countersue in what became known as
SLAPP-Back suits.  These SLAPP-Back suits against the deep
pockets of certain industries soon began enjoying increased suc-
cess with large damage awards for harassment and other dam-
ages awarded to the individuals targeted by the initial SLAPP
suits.225  The result was a chilling effect on most industries con-
sidering bringing SLAPP suits,226 and this chilling effect was
compounded by a trend toward enacting state statutes to assist
individuals fighting SLAPP suits.227  Perhaps an even greater
chilling effect on some industries initiating SLAPP suits was the
220 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, at app. II at p. II-1.
221 Leader Appointed , supra  note 218.
222 See , e.g. , Laurence Arnold, Gambling-Addiction Report Stirs Debate , ADVO-
CATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Mar. 19, 1999, at 2A, available at  1999 WL 6098726.
223 See , e.g. , Jennifer Peter, Chairwoman Helped Unite Gambling Panel , VIRGIN-
IAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), June 19, 1999, at A1, available at  1999
WL 7168361.
224 See , e.g. , George W. Pring, SLAPPs:  Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Partici-
pation , 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3 (1989).
225 See , e.g.,  John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Prob-
lem SLAPPS , 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395 (1993).
226 See generally GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS:  GETTING
SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996).
227 See , e.g. , MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2003).
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discovery process, which necessarily accompanied such suits and
subjected the companies involved to the public disclosure of sen-
sitive and/or embarrassing information.
The classic example of far-reaching impacts caused by unantic-
ipated revelations generated by the legal discovery process in-
volved the Paula C. Jones lawsuit filed in 1994 against President
William J. Clinton.  The sexual harassment suit228 demonstrated
that even a sitting president could be made vulnerable to the dis-
covery process of information pursuant “to a civil suit . . . [which
led] to the Monica Lewinsky scandal and ultimately the impeach-
ment hearings.”229
B. SLAPP Suits Against Public Citizens Groups
A classic example of what should be termed a SLAPP suit to
deter anti-gambling citizens groups occurred in 2001 after the
Greenbrier resort in West Virginia lost a Nov. 7, 2000 referen-
dum to bring casino gambling to the Greenbrier by a vote of
7,065 to 5,109.230  The Greenbrier Hotel filed a $36-million defa-
mation case against a leader of the citizens group, attorney Barry
Bruce of Lewisburg, West Virginia.231  Bruce refused to be
cowed, but before he could file a countersuit, Greenbrier Presi-
dent Ted Kleisner quickly dropped the hotel’s case.  Thereafter,
both sides agreed in the future to comply with the West Virginia
Code of Fair Campaign Practices.232  Although the Greenbrier
had the option of pursuing a second referendum in 2002, the
number of anti-casino voters purportedly increased between
2000 and 2002, and the Greenbrier decided to forgo a second
referendum.
Another example of a SLAPP suit involving gambling issues
occurred before the election on November 7, 2000.  Massachu-
setts ballot “Question 3” contained an initiative by a citizens’
228 See  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (holding that sitting president not
immune from lawsuits).
229 Barbara Palmer et al., Low-Life-Sleazy Big-Haired-Trailer Park Girl v. The
President:  The Paula Jones Case and the Law of Sexual Harassment , 9 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 283, 284 (2001).  For the U.S. House of Representatives
report on the impeachment of President William J. Clinton (D), see H.R. Rep. No.
105-830 (1998).
230 Greenbrier Resort Drops Lawsuit , ROANOKE TIMES, June 23, 2001, at B4
[hereinafter Greenbrier Resort Drops Lawsuit].
231 Id.  Complaint, Greenbrier Resort Mgt. Co. v. Bruce, No. 01-0-80(J) (Cir. Ct.,
Greenbrier County, W. Va. filed Apr. 20, 2001).
232 Greenbrier Resort Drops Lawsuit , supra  note 230.
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group, Grey2K, and community leaders, such as Carey Theil, to
ban dog racing in Massachusetts.233  Charles Sarkis, owner of
Wonderland Greyhound Park in Revere, Massachusetts, filed a
$10-million defamation action against Grey2K just five days
before the election.234  Andrew Upton, the attorney for Grey2K,
summarized:  “This is a Nixonian pattern of intimidation and har-
assment by the track owners. . . . The track owners have millions
of dollars at stake in this industry.”235
The day before the election, Superior Court Judge Margot
Botsford refused to grant Wonderland Greyhound Park an in-
junction blocking Grey2K’s ads,236 and the attorneys for Grey2K
filed a special motion with the same judge seeking “to dismiss the
defamation lawsuit Sarkis filed against the group.”237  Grey2K’s
attorneys “argued that the suit should be dismissed under the
state’s anti-SLAPP statute, which prohibits the use of frivolous
litigation or intimidation tactics against people trying to exercise
their constitutional rights.”238  Although Grey2K lost the elec-
tion, they won the initial legal decisions involving the SLAPP
suit.239  By April 13, 2001, the defendant’s special motion for dis-
missal had been granted240 pursuant to the Massachusetts anti-
SLAPP statute.241
By comparison, in 1992 the tobacco industry began a series of
legal maneuvers that de facto, if not de jure, harassed the authors
233 Rick Klein, Track Owner Sues Backers of Dog Questions , BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 4, 2000, at B1, available at  2000 WL 3349358 [hereinafter Track Sues].  For
another example, see Wichita Racetrack Warns Critics of Suit:  Testimony Before
Legislative Panel Is Called Slanderous , KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 17, 1997, at C4, availa-
ble at  http://www.kansascity.com (the track quickly withdrew its objection).
234 Track Sues , supra  note 233. Compare  Verified Complaint, Sarkis v. Grey2K,
No. 00-4891-E (Super. Ct., Suffolk, Mass. filed Nov. 2, 2000), with  Answer to Plain-
tiff’s Verified Complaint, id.  (filed Dec. 4, 2000).
235 Track Sues , supra  note 233.
236 See Sarkis , No. 00-4891-E (filed Nov. 6, 2000); Sacha Pfeiffer, Judge Refuses to
Block Greyhound Ads , BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2000, at B6, available at  2000 WL
3349595 [hereinafter Judge Refuses].
237 Judge Refuses , supra  note 236.
238 Id. See also  Scott Van Voorhis, Greyhound Dogfight Bitter to End , BOSTON
HERALD, Nov. 7, 2000, at 10, available at  2000 WL 4340030.
239 Compare  Defendant’s Special Motion For Dismissal Under G.L. c.231, § 59H
and Request For Hearing, Sarkis , No. 00-4891-E (filed Nov. 15, 2000), with  Plain-
tiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendants’ Emergency Special
Motion to Dismiss under G.L. c.231, § 59H, id.  (filed Dec. 5, 2000).
240 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant’s Special Mo-
tion for Dismissal, id.  (filed Apr. 13, 2001).
241 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2003).
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of a study embarrassing to the industry.242  The “study . . .
showed that ‘Old Joe’ [Camel] was nearly universally recognized
by six-year-old children, a level of awareness that matched the
logo for the Disney channel.”243  The prestigious Journal of the
American Medical Association  published the study.244  The har-
assment of the study’s authors eventually led legal scholars and
academics to call for changes in Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to restrict the ability of an industry to abuse the
discovery process.245  However, in this “Old Joe” scenario, the
scientists involved were admittedly unsophisticated regarding the
legal process246 and probably unaware of their multiple legal
counteractions including discovery of sensitive industry informa-
tion as well as countersuits.  In fact, some groups could be pre-
pared to engage the issues for the public welfare, regardless of an
industry’s “deep pockets.”
CONCLUSION
This analysis has focused on the great leverage that gambling’s
opponents can find in the legal discovery process.  This conclu-
sion will focus on the significant need for this power of discovery
as pro-gambling interests exert substantial power in acting as sov-
242 See generally , Paul M. Fischer, Science and Subpoenas:  When Do the Courts
Become Instruments of Manipulation? , 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1996)
[hereinafter Science and Subpoenas].
243 Id.  at 159.  For the published study, see Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo
Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years:  Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel ,
266 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3145 (1991).
244 Science and Subpoenas , supra  note 242.
245 For a summary of this scenario in the tobacco industry, see Wendy E. Wagner,
Rough Justice and the Attorney General Litigation , 33 GA. L. REV. 935, 946-48
(1999).  The academics could have reversed the de facto impact of the discovery
process via countersuits, which would have perhaps embarrassed the tobacco indus-
try by requesting and/or revealing sensitive industry information including industry
marketing surveys and the interface with the use of nicotine. Id. See also FED. R.
CIV. P. 45; Bert Black, Research and its Revelation:  When Should Courts Compel
Disclosure? , 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 180-83 (1996) (calling for specific
changes to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address abuses in the
discovery process relating to third party research).  For an entire law publication
dedicated to these issues, see Symposium, Court-Ordered Disclosure of Academic
Research:  A Clash of Values of Science and Law , 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2
(1996).  Accused by the tobacco industry of improprieties, the academics involved
were eventually exonerated by their colleagues.  Wagner, supra  at 947-48 nn.52-54.
See generally  Anna Burdeshaw Fretwell, Note, Clearing the Air:  An Argument for a
Federal Cause of Action to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Smokers Injured by
Tobacco Companies , 31 GA. L. REV. 929 (1997).
246 Science and Subpoenas , supra  note 242, at 166-67.
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ereigns, as possible scofflaws, as taking it all, and as above the
law.
A. Gambling Interests as Sovereigns
After five years of legal actions, in 1998 Mike Strain was
awarded $5.2 million in a case against the City of Hammond, In-
diana, and the Empress Casino riverboat.247  Strain, who owned
the Great Lakes Inland Marina, claimed de facto that the local
government in concert with gambling interests utilized the sover-
eign powers of eminent domain to take his land.248  He alleged
“he was not offered a fair market value and was denied due pro-
cess to recoup a half-acre of land condemned by the city to build
a highway overpass at the marina.”249  The Empress Casino,
“which built the overpass as part of its agreement with the city,
[was] responsible for the damages.”250  The Indiana Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the judgment.251
B. Gambling Interests as Scofflaws?
On November 6, 1985, the City of Las Vegas formed the Las
Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency,252 which “is actually
the City Council of Las Vegas [because] there are no public
members of the Agency.”253  To begin the eminent domain pro-
cess to obtain property for a redevelopment project later known
as the Fremont Street Experience, the Agency filed a “Complaint
in Eminent Domain and a Motion for Order Permitting Immedi-
ate Occupancy Pending Entry of Judgment” on November 19,
1993, against defendant landowners, the Carol Pappas family.254
247 Jury Awards $5.2 Million in Casino Case , CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at 10,
available at  1998 WL 5600435 [hereinafter Jury Awards $5.2 Million].
248 See id.  “The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its
regular organization, to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its dominion
over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public exigency and for the
public good.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 616 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).  Governmental
units exercising eminent domain must give “just compensation” to the owner of the
realty equating to a “fair return on the value of the property,” which is a concept
deemed synonymous with “due process of law.” Id.  at 1001-02.
249 Jury Awards $5.2 Million , supra  note 247.
250 Id.
251 City of Hammond v. Marina Entm’t Complex, Inc., 733 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000).
252 Respondents’ Answering Brief at 3, City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelop-
ment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev. filed Feb. 2, 2000) (No. 33812).
253 Id.
254 Id.  at 4, 7.
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Delayed service of process was made upon Mrs. Pappas, an eld-
erly widow, on December 8, 1993.255  The Pappas land was alleg-
edly “stripped from them in less than 50 seconds in a summary
proceeding on December 15, 1993 at which they were not even
present.”256
It took another three years before the Agency’s exercise of
eminent domain resulted in a judicial decision.257  In the interim,
a parking garage concomitant to the Fremont Street Experience
was built on the Pappas’s land because city fathers were con-
vinced that the Fremont Street Experience and adjacent parking
were essential to revitalize downtown casinos bordering Fremont
Street.258  In City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment
Agency v. Pappas , Judge Don P. Chairez granted the Pappas’s
motion to dismiss the Agency’s eminent domain action and
ruled:
The Agency has acted contrary to law and in an arbitrary and
capricious manner as to the adoption of its initial plan in 1986,
in its failure to amend the plan for the various projects that it
engages in to meet the specificity requirements, in its failure to
hold the requisite public hearings, in its failure to allow owner
participation in its projects, in its failure to show the inability
of its private partners to purchase property without the use of
eminent domain and in its failure to negotiate in good faith
with current landowners.259
As part of his decision, Judge Chairez reviewed and analyzed
“whether the City had adequate information to make a finding of
blight as to the redevelopment area or if the designation of the
area was arbitrary and capricious.”260  He ruled:
[T]he Agency merely took the statutes and constructed them
into a plan. . . . The Agency simply designated an area of the
City as subject to redevelopment and then wrote a report that
would satisfy the statutes by incorporating the language of the
statute as evidence.  The Agency, the Planning Commission
and the City Council must all pass upon this Plan yet not one
of these entities inquired as to the factual findings for their
resolutions.  It is important to note that the Agency and the
City Council are one and the same.  It is obvious therefore
that they were aware of the lack of empirical evidence to con-
255 Id.  at 7.
256 Id.  at 8.
257 Id. , No. A327519 (Nev. 13th Dist. Ct. July 3, 1996).
258 Respondents’ Answering Brief at 3-11, Pappas , 76 P.3d 1.
259 Id. , No. A327519 at 64.
260 Id.  at 42-43.
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firm their actions.  The failure to obtain evidence prior to the
confirmation of the redevelopment area, which was known to
all three entities at the time of the approval of the plan, led to
the area having been designated in an arbitrary and capricious
manner and as such the municipality’s actions are violative of
the statutes.  The Court finds that there was not substantial
evidence to support the findings of the Agency, the Commis-
sion and the City Council.261
Even with this decision, it took another six years, until August
2002, before the Nevada Supreme Court granted the Pappas fam-
ily’s “Motion to Expedite the Briefing and Resolution of the Ap-
peal.”262  Among legal watchdog groups, this case was included
among “The Top 10 Abuses of Eminent Domain” by the Insti-
tute for Justice’s Castle Coalition,263 and Pappas  was highlighted
by one national magazine in deciding to designate Las Vegas as
one of the top ten most corrupt cities in America.264  The coali-
tion summarized the history of the Pappas case:
Unbeknownst to Mrs. Pappas, however, [in 1993] there was a
hearing in only seven days to decide whether the agency
would get immediate possession of the property.  Mrs. Pappas
did not know about the hearing and did not attend.  The Judge
granted title to the agency, and the buildings were promptly
demolished.  Later, the Judge recused himself because he had
invested in one of the casinos that was to acquire the property.
The case has been in litigation ever since.  In 1996, [Judge
Chairez] ruled that the condemnations were unconstitutional
and illegal.  In a harshly worded 65-page opinion, the judge
found that the agency had “set itself up as an entity only unto
itself.”  The court found that the agency ignored many statutes
and procedures.  For example, the supposed justification for
the condemnation was that the area was blighted.  However,
the surveys of the area revealed no blight, and in fact, no one
had even surveyed Mrs. Pappas’ block.
261 Id.  at 43.
262 Id. , No. 39255 (Nev. Aug. 21, 2002) (granting motion, motion to expedite the
briefing, and resolution of appeal).
263 DANA BERLINGER, CASTLE COALITION, GOVERNMENT THEFT:  THE TOP 10
ABUSES OF EMINENT DOMAIN:  1998-2002, at 8 (2002), available at  http://www.
castlecoalition.org/top_10_abuses/top_10_report.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNMENT
THEFT]. See also  Vin Suprynowicz, Column, The Most Valuable Corner in the
World , ELKO DAILY FREE PRESS, Mar. 6, 1996, reprinted in LIBERTARIAN ENTER-
PRISE, Mar. 1996, http://www.webleyweb.com/tle/le960301. html.
264 Craig Offman, The 10 Most Corrupt Cities in America , GEORGE, Mar. 1998, at
90, available at  1998 WL 31007411.  For advertisements attacking the casino interests
of Steve Wynn, Bill Boyd, and Jackie Gaughan as well as Becky, Ted, and Jack Bin-
ion as those interest interfaced with the Pappas  case, see Eminent Domain or Emi-
nent Thievery , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 20, 2003, at B3; Eminent Domain Case
Draws National Outrage , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Apr. 1, 2003, at B3.
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On March 29, 2000, the Nevada Supreme Court threw out
the city’s second too-early appeal and warned the city’s attor-
neys against providing further “misleading” information.  Af-
ter a series of judges recused themselves for accepting
campaign contributions from casino interests, the Nevada Su-
preme Court ruled that campaign contributions did not dis-
qualify judges.265
On September 8, 2003, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that
the taking of the Pappas’s property in 1993 by the Las Vegas
Downtown Redevelopment Authority (which was actually the
Las Vegas City Council) did not violate the eminent domain pro-
visions266 of either the U.S. Constitution267 or the Nevada Con-
stitution.268  This textbook example of eminent domain being
manipulated to the monetary benefit of casino interests
prompted the Executive Director of the National Coalition
Against Legalized Gambling to opine:  “Does the public expect
the ‘elected’ Nevada justices to rule against Nevada’s political
powerhouses?”269
This type of case highlighted the larger issues of whether pro-
gambling interests reflected so much financial and political influ-
ence that a scofflaw attitude was becoming endemic among those
interests.  In 1994, Professor Robert Goodman’s leading-edge
book, Legalized Gambling as a Strategy for Economic Develop-
ment , cautioned the decriminalization of gambling would lead to
such problems,270 and his conclusions and concerns were echoed
thereafter in forums such as 1994 and 1995 congressional
hearings.271
265 GOVERNMENT THEFT, supra  note 263.  For more on the city’s failure to survey
the Pappas property, see Pappas , No. A327518.  For more on the Nevada Supreme
Court’s dismissal of the city’s second appeal, see Mike Zapler, Settlement Talks Be-
tween City, Family Stalled , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Apr. 11, 2000, at 1B, available at
2000 WL 8203861; Editorial, Misleading the Court , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Apr. 11,
2000, at 6B, available at  2000 WL 8203868.  The supreme court’s ruling on judicial
recusals is City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Eighth Judicial
District Court, 5 P.3d 1059 (Nev. 2000). See also  Ed Vogel, State’s High Court Rules
Judge Can Stay on Redevelopment Case , LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 19, 2000 at 1B;
available at  2000 WL 8210199.
266 City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1
(Nev. 2003).
267 U.S. CONSTITUTION, amend. V.
268 NEV. CONST. art. 1 § 8(6).
269 Tom Grey, Comments at the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling
Annual Conference (Sept. 25-27, 2003).
270 ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 16-19 (1994).
271 See generally, The National Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation:  Hearing
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C. Gambling Interests As “Taking It All”
In 1974, New Jersey voters rejected a state constitutional
amendment that would have permitted casino gambling in Atlan-
tic City.272  On November 2, 1976, the voters accepted a similar
amendment273 “after a long history of a constitutional prohibi-
tion on legalized gambling.”274  In this context, “the primary dif-
ference between the [1974 and 1976] amendments was the fact
that the Casino Amendment specifically dedicated revenues de-
rived by the State from privately owned casino gambling estab-
lishments to projects designed to aid senior citizens and disabled
residents.”275  The Casino Amendment stated:
Any law authorizing the establishment and operation of such
gambling establishments shall provide for the State revenues
derived therefrom to be applied solely for the purpose of pro-
viding . . . reductions in property taxes, rental, telephone, gas,
electric, and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citi-
zens and disabled residents of the State, . . . in accordance with
such formulae as the Legislature shall by law provide.276
Once the voters had been prompted by the public relations cam-
paign of “benefits to senior citizens” to approve the casino gam-
bling, there was a legislative maneuver designed to redirect the
funds for senior citizens back to the benefit of gambling
interests.277
In 1984, the New Jersey legislature created the Casino Rein-
vestment Development Authority.278
In this act, casinos are presented with a choice between paying
an additional tax of 2.5% of gross revenues to the Casino Rev-
enue Fund for the benefit of senior citizens and the disabled,
or making “investments” of one-half of that amount (i.e.,
1.25% of gross revenues) in CRDA bonds or other projects
before the House Comm. on Small Bus. , 103d Cong. 77-81 (1994) [hereinafter Con-
gressional Gambling Hearing 1994]; Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 , supra
note 173.
272 See U.S. COMM’N ON THE REV. OF A NAT’L POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, GAM-
BLING IN AMERICA (1976) [hereinafter U.S. COMM’N GAMBLING].
273 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 2 (“Casino Amendment”).
274 Press Release, Carella, Byrne, Bain, Gilfillan, Cecchi, Stewart & Olstein,
Carella, Byrne, Bain, Gilfillan, Cecchi, Stewart & Olstein:  Senior Groups Join To-
gether in Suit to Protect Their Share of Casino Revenues (June 20, 1997), available
at  WL, Allnewsplus [hereinafter Groups Join Together].
275 Id.
276 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 2.
277 See  Groups Join Together, supra  note 274.
278 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-153 (West 1996).
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approved by CRDA. . . . Given this “choice,” casinos have ob-
viously made the CRDA investments, thereby retaining 1.25%
of their gross revenues and depriving the Casino Revenue
Fund of an additional 2.5% of the casino’s gross revenues.
Upon information and belief, over $400 million has been so
“invested” by the casinos.279
To reclaim these funds, large groups of New Jersey senior citizens
filed suit in 1997 against New Jersey, the state treasurer, and the
Casino Reinvestment Development Authority for the unconstitu-
tional use of hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue derived
from casino gambling.280
D. Gambling Interests As “Above the Law”:  State Examples
1. New York
Even after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center, pro-gambling lobbyists callously pushed through previ-
ously stalled legislation authorizing new casinos in New York
State.281  Although an arguable violation of the New York Con-
stitution (which required two successive legislatures to approve a
constitutional change regarding gambling),282 Gov. George
279 Groups Join Together, supra  note 274 (citation omitted).  For statutory lan-
guage regarding taxes and investments, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-144.1 (West
1996).
280 Groups Join Together, supra  note 274.
281 New York leaders put ongoing discussions about gambling on hold after the 9/
11 attacks.  Tom Precious, Terrorist Attacks Delay Key Initiatives , BUFFALO NEWS,
Sept. 20, 2001, at B1, available at  2001 WL 6358040.  Discussions eventually re-
turned to the casino legislation because of its potential for economic development
and increased state revenues, especially in the face of economic losses suffered by
the 9/11 attacks.  Marc Humbert, Post-Terrorist Attacks, Pataki and Legislature Eye
Gambling Expansion , ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Oct. 24, 2001, available at
WL Allnewsplus. See also  Tom Precious & Jerry Zremski, Challengers Prepare
Lawsuit , BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 28, 2001, at A1, available at  2001 WL 6362624 (“‘I
find it immoral that our Legislature would use the tragedy of the attack on the
World Trade Center as a rationale for victimizing the most vulnerable in our com-
munities on the altar of casinos and slot machines,’ said the Rev. G. Stanford
Bratton.”).
282 Generally, legislative approval of a casino would require a constitutional
change, which would have to be approved by two successive legislative sessions.  Joel
Stashenko, Bruno, Silver Say Gambling Talks Driven by Post-Sept. 11 Revenue Loss ,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Oct. 22, 2001, available at  WL, Allnewsplus.  The
two-session requirement was not applied to the legislation that approved Indian
casinos, leading to a lawsuit challenging the legality of the casinos. Id. ; James M.
Odato, Lawsuit Challenges Gaming Law , TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan. 30,
2002, at B4, available at  2002 WL 8887949.
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Pataki (R) signed the bill into law in 2001.283  The constitutional-
ity of this legislation was immediately challenged by state Sen.
Frank Padavan (R), Assemblyman William L. Parment (D), the
Saratoga Chamber of Commerce, and other plaintiffs via attor-
ney Cornelius D. Murray.284
If the socio-economic cost/benefit analysis of the New York ca-
sino proposals were negative and unconvincing to economists
and legislators before the 9/11 attacks, then the cost/benefits
were not changed by the 9/11 attacks.  The only change was the
new atmosphere of ill-advised and panicked decisionmaking
which allowed the 2001 New York casino proposal to move for-
ward and be legalized.
On June 12, 2003, Murray won a parallel NewYork case, Sara-
toga County Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki  in a 4-3 decision of
the New York Court of Appeals,285 which held that the governor
could not bypass the state legislature when authorizing tribal
casinos.286  The net effect was to invalidate a ten-year-old com-
pact between Gov. Mario Cuomo and the Akwesasne Mohawks
for a casino in Hoganburg, New York.287  The U.S. Supreme
Court declined to hear the case, thereby affirming Murray’s win
in Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce .288
President Franklin D. Roosevelt conquered the Great Depres-
sion without legalizing casinos, because decriminalized gambling
would catalyze destructive economic policies.  However, in 2001,
New York’s legislators ignored the fundamental economic princi-
ples of legalized gambling, as well as the New York Constitution,
and licensed more casinos.
2. Indiana
The fast-shuffle tactics of pro-gambling interests and their fail-
ure to comply with state constitutional provisions was exempli-
fied by their unconstitutional legislative gambling mandates in
283 Carolyn Thompson, Pataki Signs Gambling Bill Into Law , TIMES UNION (Al-
bany, N.Y.), Nov. 1, 2001, at B2, available at  2001 WL 24817715.
284 Shaila K. Dewan, Fighting Gambling, While Keeping His Hand In , N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2002, at B2, available at  LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All (En-
glish, Full Text).
285 Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y.
2003), cert. denied , 124 S. Ct. 570 (2003) (mem.).
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. ; Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Indian Gambling Case , ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWIRES, Nov. 17, 2003, available at  WL, Allnewsplus.
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New York after the 9/11 tragedy.289  Yet even without a national
tragedy as a PR impetus, pro-gambling interests evidence little
regard for pre-existing legislative and constitutional safeguards,
as was exemplified in Indiana in 1993.  During a 1993 special ses-
sion of the Indiana General Assembly, convened by Gov. Evan
Bayh (D) to pass the 1994-95 biennial budget, a separate bill that
authorized casino gambling on riverboats but failed during the
regular session “was attached as an amendment to the budget bill
during a conference committee.”290  This logrolled bill was
quarterbacked by state Sen. Earline Rogers (D)291 and passed by
both houses of the General Assembly; although it was vetoed by
Gov. Bayh, the General Assembly repassed the budget bill into
law.292  Thus, the gambling riverboat language was codified.293
A group of Indiana citizens filed suit against the state in
Schulz, Phillips & Becker v. Indiana .294  The suit claimed the
gambling riverboat legislation violated the following state consti-
tutional provisions:
1. “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen . . .
privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms,
shall not belong to all citizens”;295
2. all legislative acts should be limited “to one subject and
matters properly connected therewith”;296 and
3. “[i]n all the cases . . . and in all other cases where a general
law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and
of uniform operation throughout the State.”297
As in other states, the net effect of the Indiana gambling
riverboat legislation was arguably to establish a special class of
gambling owners with de facto gambling monopolies within their
geographic markets (which also crossed state lines into non-ca-
sino states).298
289 See supra  notes 281-84 & accompanying text.
290 Amended Complaint paras. 7-8, at 2-3, Schulz, No. 31C01-9610-CP-214 (Cir.
Ct., Harrison County, Ind. filed June 30, 1998).
291 Cam Simpson, Legislative Waters Were Choppy for a Long Time , EVANS-VILLE
COURIER, Oct. 24, 1993, at 15A, available at  1993 WL 6174583.
292 Amended Complaint paras. 8-10, at 2-3, Schulz , No. 31C01-9610-CP-214.
293 IND. CODE § 4-33-3-1 (2001).
294 Amended Complaint, Schulz , No. 31C01-9610-CP-214.
295 IND. CONST. art. I, § 23.
296 Id.  art. IV, § 19.
297 Id.  art. IV, § 23.
298 See generally Gambling Subsidized by Taxpayers , supra  note 171. See also
John Warren Kindt, Legalizing Gambling Activities:  The Issues Involving Market
Saturation , 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 271 (1995).
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The Indiana case was appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court
via a petition to transfer,299 but it was not heard on its merits due
to an ironic procedural twist which virtually prohibited a major-
ity vote of the justices.
Only Chief Justice Shepard voted to deny the petition on the
merits.  Justices Dickson and Rucker voted to grant the peti-
tion.  Justice Boehm voted to deny the petition, but only be-
cause Justice Sullivan could not participate.  Remember,
Justice Sullivan had a conflict because he was the state Budget
Director when the Gambling Statute was logrolled in with the
budget bill.  Justice Boehm specifically noted that he thought
the issue was of great public importance.300
The vote was two justices in favor of granting the petition to
transfer, two against, and one abstention due to a potential con-
flict of interest.301  Thus, the case of unconstitutionality was
never decided on its merits.
3. South Carolina
During the 1990s South Carolina served as the pre-eminent ex-
ample of a state dominated by pro-gambling interests.302  In 1985
a gambling provision slipped unnoticed into South Carolina legis-
lation,303 and this provision, coupled with a 1991 South Carolina
Supreme Court decision allowing de facto payouts, precipitated a
massive influx of video gambling machines into the state.304  At
the cost of his own political career, as both a governor and a
potential vice-presidential candidate, South Carolina Gov. David
Beasley (R) courageously legislated the VGMs out of the state,
299 See  Brief in Opposition to Transfer, Schulz , 741 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. filed Sept.
5, 2000).
300 Letter from Richard A. Waples, plaintiff’s attorney, to Walter Schulz et al.,
plaintiffs (Dec. 12, 2000) (on file with Richard A. Waples).
301 Schulz , 741 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. 2000) (table).
302 See , e.g. , NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, at chs. 2-3.
303 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-60 (1985).  The words “money or property” were
struck from the statutory ban against distributions from gambling machines via state
Sen. Jack Lindsay (D). See , e.g. , Margaret N. O’Shea, Video-Poker Ban Presents
Obstacles , AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, June 11, 2000, at A1, available at  WL, SC-News.
For the most comprehensive analysis of court cases related to pathological gambling
and gambling’s interface with the political, social and economic environments, see
R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy To Misfortune:  The Merger
of Law and Politics in the World of Gambling , 72 MISS. L.J. 565 (2002) [hereinafter
The Merger of Law and Politics in Gambling ]. See also NGISC FINAL REPORT,
supra  note 77, at 2-5.
304 State v. Blackmon, 403 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 1991).
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and they were gone by 2000.305  At its height in the mid-1990s,
the South Carolina gambling interests were estimated to be
grossing an amount nearly half the size of the entire state
budget306 and keeping almost thirty percent of the gross.307  Mul-
tiple cases involving pathological gamblers resulted in multi-mil-
lion-dollar judgments against the owners of VGMs.308  However,
collecting those judgments from elusive, corrupt, and sometimes
criminal VGM owners was difficult and time-consuming.309
4. West Virginia
The West Virginia scenario exemplifies the gambling principle
of “migration of illegality.”  Once the South Carolina VGMs
were de facto recriminalized in 2000, many of the VGMs moved
into other states, such as Georgia and West Virginia, and the
VGMs began operating illegally.  In 2002, in Georgia, the legisla-
ture refused to legalize the VGMs,310 which was the scenario in
practically every other state.  However, in West Virginia the ille-
gal machines were progressively legalized in specialized legisla-
tion, particularly in 2001 with specific legislative strong-arming
by Gov. Bob Wise (D).311  By 2003, West Virginia had legalized
9,049 VGMs, specifically video lottery terminals (VLTs), at the
four racetracks in Charles Town, Chester, Nitro, and Wheel-
305 The Merger of Law and Politics in Gambling , supra  note 303, at 590-98; Jim
Drinkard & William M. Welch, Gambling Industry Ups the Ante in Politics , USA
TODAY, Jan. 8, 1999, at A8, available at  1999 WL 6831072 [hereinafter Gambling
Industry Ups Ante in Politics]; see  Rick Bragg, End Video Poker Gambling, South
Carolina Chief Urges , N.Y. TIMES, Jan 22, 1998, at A14, available at  LEXIS, News &
Business, News, News, All (English, Full Text) [hereinafter End Video Gambling].
306 Id.
307 Id.  South Carolina gambling interests grossed $2.5 billion, according to state
figures in 1999, the same year the South Carolina’s state budget was $5.3 billion. See
NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, at 2-5 (letter from D. John Taylor, Manager,
South Carolina Department of Revenue, to the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission (Apr. 26, 1999)); Lawmakers Return to Finish Budget, Other Business ,
HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), June 23, 1999, at 9A, available at  1999 WL 9648271. See
also End Video Poker Gambling , supra  note 305; Gambling Industry Ups the Ante in
Politics , supra  note 305.
308 See generally The Merger of Law and Politics in Gambling , supra  note 303.
309 See generally id.
310 Rhonda Cook, U.S. Judge Halts Use of Poker Machines , ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Jun. 26, 2002, at B1, available at  2002 WL 3727664; Bill Rankin & Rhonda Cook,
Video Poker Loses Bet on Georgia High Court , ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 29, 2002,
at A1, available at  2002 WL 3724236.
311 Randy Coleman, Wise Signs Video Poker Legislation , ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, May 8, 2001, available at  WL, Allnewsplus, reprinted as W. Va. Gover-
nor Moves Ahead with Video-Poker Strategy , ROANOKE TIMES, May 9, 2001, at A5.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE201.txt unknown Seq: 59  2-MAR-04 15:56
Subpoenaing Information from the Gambling Industry 279
ing.312  Another 5,275 machines were located in bars and restau-
rants.313  Apparently in contravention of the West Virginia
Constitution, the state’s “take” from its VGMs was tied to spe-
cialized legislative programs.314  Represented by Jackson County
attorney Larry Harless, citizens groups filed a lawsuit on June 11,
2003, claiming that the West Virginia Lottery was not enforcing
existing laws and VLT regulations, and that the VGMs consti-
tuted an “economic threat.”315  Summarized in 1994 and recon-
firmed throughout the next decade, the socio-economic costs of
new legalized gambling activities were $3 for every $1 in bene-
fits.316  Lewisburg attorney Barry Bruce and Paula McLaughlin,
treasurer of the Greenbrier County Coalition Against Gambling
Expansion, noted that not one state with widespread gambling,
including Nevada,317 was “really well off financially.”318
Appealed directly and quickly to the West Virginia Supreme
Court, the petition filed by Harless claimed the video poker ma-
chine payouts were “rigged . . . to ensure that over time, almost
all players lose their money.”319  In the context of marketing, the
312 Paul J. Nyden, Groups File Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling , CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Jun. 12, 2003, at 12A, available at  2003 WL 5468822 [hereinafter Suit to
Shut Down Video Gambling].
313 Id.
314 See , e.g. , id.
315 Id.
316 Congressional Gambling Hearing 1994 , supra  note 271, 77-81 & nn.9, 12
(statement of John Warren Kindt, Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham-
paign). See also  John Warren Kindt, The Business-Economic Impacts of Licensed
Casino Gambling in West Virginia:  Short-Term Gain But Long-Term Pain , 13 W.
VA. U. PUB. AFF. REP. 22 (1996), available at  http://www.polsci. wvu.edu/faculty/
dilger/PS321/report13.22.htm [hereinafter Business-Economic Impacts of Gam-
bling]; Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, Business Profitability Versus Social
Profitability:  Evaluating Industries with Externalities, the Case of Casinos , 22 MANA-
GERIAL & DECISION ECON. 143, 153 (2001), available at  http://www. terry.uga.edu/
~dmustard/profitability.pdf [hereinafter The Case of Casinos]; Casinos and Crime,
supra  note 197; Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, Management and Information
Issues for Industries with Externalities:  The Case of Casino Gambling , 22 MANAGE-
RIAL & DECISION ECON. 1 (2001), available at  http://www.business.uiuc.edu/grinols/
pdf/Paper82-300CT02.pdf.  See supra  note 205 and accompanying text.
317 In 2003, Nevada Gov. Kenny Guinn (R) stated in his State of the State address
that taxes from gambling sources were unreliable and poor fiscal policy.  Nevada
Gov. Kenny Guinn, State of the State Address to the Nevada Legislature (Jan. 20,
2003), available at  http://gov.state.nv.us/sos2003.htm.
318 See Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling , supra  note 312. See , e.g. , John War-
ren Kindt, Column, Time to Cut Better Deal with Casinos, or Take Them Over , CHI.
SUN-TIMES, June 4, 2003, at 51, available at  2003 WL 9554955.
319 Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling , supra  note 312. Compare id. , with Free
Credit , supra  note 10, (providing formulae for “gambler’s ruin”).
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petition also claimed the West Virginia Lottery was “violating
state law by engaging in illegal ‘advertising and promotional ac-
tivities to entice and induce persons to gamble, or gamble
more.’”320
On Oct. 17, 2003, three justices of the West Virginia Supreme
Court issued their opinion that had the net effect of leaving in
place the state’s VGMs.321  However, concurring Justice
Starcher’s “lament instead of a dissent” was illustrative of the
dilemmas faced by the judicial community:322
Professionally, I think that the Legislature, which has over-
whelmingly [actually a procedural one-vote margin in 2001]
and repeatedly voted to establish a massive, statewide, govern-
ment-operated gambling system in West Virginia—and to fi-
nance a significant piece of our public budget from that
system—has the legal right to do so under our Constitution .
Personally, I question whether it is right or wise for my gov-
ernment to set up and operate this massive, statewide, govern-
ment-operated gambling system—and to use, in managing this
system, thousands of privately-managed sites that are impossi-
ble to supervise and monitor; and to also use thousands of
gambling devices that are known to be especially dangerous
and addictive; and then to make it next to impossible for fu-
ture generations to cancel, revamp, or restrict this system, be-
cause of the legal obligation to pay off bonds that are based on
gambling revenues.323
Evidently, the justices had the opportunity to distinguish the
court and reinforce the rule of law by restraining the West Vir-
ginia gambling bureaucracy via writs of mandamus.  The oxymo-
ron of this case was that the court declined to restrain the
gambling bureaucracy based on apparent political considerations
rather than adhere to a strict interpretation of the West Virginia
Constitution as supported by the practical facts.
5. Nebraska
Unlike the West Virginia Supreme Court in 2003, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court adhered to a strict interpretation of the
state constitutional safeguards and rebuffed attempts by pro-
gambling interests to circumvent those safeguards. Loontjer v.
Robinson  highlights the necessity for the judicial system to incor-
320 Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling , supra  note 312.
321 State ex rel. City of Charleston v. W.V. Econ. Dev. Auth., 588 S.E.2d 655
(W.V. 2003).
322 Id.  at 674 (Starcher, J., “concurring and lamenting”).
323 Id. See W.V. CONST. art. VI § 36.
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porate and apply the public policy safeguards inherent in state
constitutions.324  This case exemplifies the confrontation between
public policy safeguards in a state constitution and the over-
whelming monetary power of the gambling industry.
Throughout the twentieth century, more than two-thirds of the
state constitutions had total prohibitions and/or other provisions
against gambling because of the overwhelming socio-economic
negatives.325  In their attempts to expand various types of gam-
bling during the 1980s and 1990s, the enormous PR dollars of
pro-gambling interests positioned lotteries as being able to gen-
erate revenues for social programs—if voters would amend their
state constitutions to allow gambling.  Misleading terminology in
these constitutional referenda often removed all prohibitions
against gambling instead of merely permitting lotteries.  The ex-
plosion of various gambling proposals during the 1990s for casi-
nos, off-track betting parlors, electronic (slots) gambling venues,
and other gambling facilities was driven by state legislative lob-
bying absent the constitutional standards, erased by lottery
“legalization.”
As a result, public votes on any gambling proposals became
rare.  Where pro-gambling interests were forced into scenarios
requiring public votes, there were frequent allegations of pro-
gambling interests’ utilizing “fronts,”326 bogus “citizen
324 Loontjer v. Robinson, 670 N.W.2d 301 (Neb. 2003).
325 Business-Economic Impacts of Gambling , supra  note 316, at 21, 22.
326 In one well-known example, two supposedly “objective” public officials wrote
opinion-editorials on behalf of two casinos.  One official was James Treffinger, the
executive for Essex County, New Jersey, whose column was published in New
Jersey’s largest newspaper, The Star Ledger .
Little did Treffinger and The Star-Ledger  know that the Ocean County Ob-
server  published an identical column two days earlier.  That column ap-
peared under the byline of H. George Buckwald, chairman of the Ocean
County Planning Board.  Both columns were copied nearly verbatim from
a “sample opinion-editorial” written by MWW/Strategic Communications
of East Rutherford.  The company sent the column along with a four-page
“fact-sheet” to state politicians in an effort to defeat the tunnel project
[that would benefit another casino competitor].
Anti-Tunnel Tactic Backfires , INT’L GAMING & WAGERING BUS., July 1996, at 12.
The press should have asked if either or both of these “objective” public officials
were offered honoraria for their writings—a question recommended by the Colum-
bia Journalism Review  when gambling issues are covered by the press.  Stephen J.
Simurda, When Gambling Comes to Town , COLUM. JOURNALISM R., Jan./Feb. 1994,
at 36-38, available at  1994 WL 12802626 [hereinafter When Gambling Comes to
Town].
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groups,”327 and even intimidation tactics against local busi-
nesses.328  When petitions were required, pro-gambling interests
had millions of dollars to back petition drives, paying those circu-
lating the petitions $2 to $3 for each signature obtained from a
registered voter.329  Critics frequently attacked these petition
drives as being misleading and including fraudulent signatures—
as typified by pro-gambling petition drives in Florida (1994),330
Arkansas (1996),331 and Missouri (1998).332  Furthermore, when
pro-gambling interests fail in their votes to expand gambling,
they have huge financial coffers to support multiple revotes.333
327 See , e.g. , John Carlson, Only Two Members:  Citizens’ Group Paid by Argosy ,
DES MOINES REG., Oct. 20, 1994, at A1 (a $100,000 advertising budget to promote a
gambling proposition was paid by a casino company via a “citizens group” consisting
of two people). See generally When Gambling Comes to Town , supra  note 326, at
36, 37 (“follow the money”).
328 See , e.g. , Tim Buckwalter, East Towne Store Evicted , NEW ERA (Lancaster,
Pa.), Oct. 16, 1995, at A1 (eviction notice arrived just days after a business owner
expressed concerns in a news article about the off-track betting parlor proposed for
a nearby section of the mall).  For instances involving the intimidation of academics,
see Congressional Gambling Hearing 1994 , supra  note 271, at 4, 12.
In another example, during the Nov. 4, 2003, election, pro-gambling interests were
accused of pressuring citizens and businesses to support a casino in French Lick,
Indiana:
Some Orange County residents say they have been threatened for refusing
to support a proposed casino in the French Lick area.  They charge that
casino backers—including state Rep. Jerry Denbo, who led the legislative
push to bring gambling to Orange County—have used their clout to
threaten loss of county contracts and to otherwise apply pressure.
329 Grace Schneider, Some Hoosiers Feeling Pressure to Back Casino , COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 20, 2003, at 1A, available at  2003 WL 65380910.  Orange
County Sheriff Doyle Cornwell chaired the pro-gambling group, Citizens for the
Future of Orange County, and carried “a box of signs in the trunk of his squad car
and said he delivers them—while on duty—to supporters” after being assured he
could. Id.
John Warren Kindt, U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base:  The
Business/Economic Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities , 39 ST. LOUIS.
U. L.J. 567, 571 n.24 (1995) [hereinafter Strategic Economic Base].
330 Id.  Martin Dyckman, Column, Misleading the Public , ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1994, at 13A, available at  1994 WL 54329601.
331 Michelle Hillier, Many Signatures Forged on Petition Expert Says , ARK. DEMO-
CRAT-GAZETTE (Little Rock, Ark.), Oct. 4, 1996, at 1B, available at  http://li-
brary.ardemgaz.com; Michelle Hillier, Inquiry Considered into Forgery Claims on
Amendment Petitions , ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Little Rock, Ark.), Oct. 5, 1996,
at 1A, available at  http://library.ardemgaz.com.
332 Paul Sloca, Scores of Signatures , Supposedly of . . ., Associated Press Pol. Ser-
vice , July 17, 1998, available at  1998 WL 7430312, reprinted in False Signatures Are
Found on Gambling Amendment Petitions , ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 18, 1998,
at A3.
333 Follow the Money , supra  note 174, at 94.
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In Missouri, there were two statewide votes rejecting or re-
stricting casinos within a period of only one and a half years
before the third vote permitted them.334  In Parkville, Missouri,
casino interests lost three votes before winning the fourth refer-
endum in two years by seventy-five votes.335  In Detroit, casinos
were rejected three times by voters during the 1980s and 1990s
before the casinos won the fourth referendum.336  Ethicists
pondered whether there ever could  be another referendum that
might oust any of these casinos, or was there a de jure or de facto
prohibition against the voters ever having such a vote.337  Would
these scenarios destroying the electoral process be patently
unconstitutional?
In this historical context, Loontjer  held that there could be no
finessing of the Nebraska constitutional safeguards338 requiring a
sworn statement of the names of the individual sponsors and
monetary contributors339 to the petition initiative.340  Writing for
the court, Justice Connolly sanguinely concluded that “knowing
the petition’s sponsor could affect the public’s view about an ini-
tiative petition. . . . [A] petition sponsored by a large casino
might have less appeal to some members of the public than a
petition sponsored by local citizens.”341  Philosophical support to
Ms. Pat Loontjer, the plaintiff, was supplied by Gambling with
the Good Life, a remarkably successful anti-gambling group, rep-
resented by Dan Hazuka, Lyle Japp, and Jon Krutz, who gave
national recognition to the Nebraska Supreme Court’s strong
stand in reaffirming policy provisions safeguarding the public
welfare.342
334 Id. ; Terry Ganey & Mark Schlinkmann, GOP’s Tidal Wave Crushes Demo-
crats:  Hancock II Out:  Slot Games In , ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 1994, at
A1, available at  1994 WL 8208472.
335 Follow the Money , supra  note 174.
336 See supra  notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
337 See generally Follow the Money , supra  note 174.
338 NEB. CONST. art. III §§ 2, 4.
339 1939 Neb. Laws, ch. 34, sec. 13, at 184-85.
340 Loontjer v. Robinson, 670 N.W.2d 301, 307-308 (Neb. 2003).
341 Id.  at 309.
342 Comments of Dan Hazuka, Lyle Japp, Jon Krutz, and Pat Loontjer, National
Coalition Against Legalized Gambling Annual Conference (Sept. 25-27, 2003).
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E. Gambling Interests as Saviors or Exploiters of Native
American Sovereignty?
Under the 1988 Indian Gambling Regulatory Act343 [hereinaf-
ter IGRA], the pursuit of expanded Native American gambling
resulted in a plethora of cases during the 1990s.  Driven by the
enormous profits in Native American gambling and by sovereign
hubris, numerous test cases were filed by Native American gam-
bling interests after the enactment of IGRA.  The most signifi-
cant test cases were developed with the goals of:  (1) expanding
the scope of Native American sovereignty in multiple legal issue
areas, (2) acquiring new lands and assets either adjacent, or even
non-adjacent to tribal lands (collectively known as “after-ac-
quired property” issues), (3) expanding or even forcing, gambling
into new geographic feeder markets,344 and (4) expanding, or
even forcing, new types of gambling into pre-existing feeder mar-
kets (e.g., illegal Internet gambling).345
In this context, the Time  cover story on December 16, 2002,
was a scathing expose´ on rampant abuses perpetrated by gam-
bling interests on the overall welfare of U.S. Native American
populations.346  IGRA is “so riddled with loopholes, so poorly
written, so discriminatory and subject to such conflicting inter-
pretation that 14 years [after IGRA’s enactment], armies of high-
priced lawyers are still debating the definition of a slot ma-
343 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994).  The IGRA was enacted to regulate tribal gam-
bling after gambling interests won their test case which opened the door to wide-
spread tribal gambling.  California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987).
344 Although there were no Indian reservations or recognized tribes in the state of
Illinois, in 2000 the Miami tribe filed test cases in Illinois claiming much of the land
in fifteen Illinois counties.  Flynn McRoberts, Tribe Stakes Claim to Illinois Land ,
CHI. TRIB., June 14, 2000, § 1, at 1, available at  2000 WL 3675191.  Eventually, it was
revealed that a New England developer was funding the test cases being filed by the
Miami—apparently in hope of settling the test cases for one or more casinos. Devel-
oper Funds Case , PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.), Jan. 10, 2001, at A1, available at
2001 WL 6497374.  The Miamis desired to locate the initial casino on lands to be
acquired near Paxton, Illinois, which was in the center of a thirty-five-mile feeder
market encompassing several large Illinois population bases.  A Paxton citizens
group, largely coordinated by Richard and Donae Porter, was influential in defeat-
ing the Miami tribe’s proposals by exposing embarrassing elements of those propos-
als.  The Miamis eventually dropped their test cases.
345 See , e.g. , Bill Lambrecht, Missouri Fights to Pull Plug on Internet Lottery , ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 8, 1997, at A1, available at  1997 WL 3346723.
346 Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune , TIME, Dec. 16,
2002, at 44, available at  2002 WL 102387053 [hereinafter Wheel of Misfortune].
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chine.”347  Instead of regulating Native American gambling,
IGRA established an abusive and chaotic system which “dis-
persed oversight responsibilities among a hopelessly conflicting
hierarchy of local, state and federal agencies.”348
One of IGRA’s statutory mandates was to promote tribal eco-
nomic development.349  However, since IGRA’s enactment in
1988 there was no evidence of widespread sustainable economic
benefit.  In fact, the “[r]evenue from gaming [was] so lopsided
that Indian casinos in five states with almost half the Native
American population—Montana, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oklahoma and South Dakota—account[ed] for less than 3% of
all casino proceeds.”350  Furthermore, an Associated Press study
in 2000 concluded that “[d]espite an explosion of Indian gam-
bling revenues—from $100 million in 1988 to $8.26 billion a dec-
ade later—an Associated Press computer analysis of federal
unemployment, . . . and public-assistance records indicates the
majority of American Indians have benefited little.”351  Although
there were “new gambling jobs, unemployment on reservations
with established casinos held steady around 54 percent between
1991 and 1997 as many of the casino jobs were filled with non-
Indians, according to data the tribes reported to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs.”352
The evidence demonstrated that Indian gambling did not even
comply with the relatively weak regulatory scheme of IGRA.  As
early as 1993, a report by the auditor general for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Interior discovered numerous legal violations and regu-
latory problems:353
[The] review identified 37 [of 117 Indian] gaming operations
that . . . were operating in apparent violation of the Act.  Also,
18 management contracts required . . . excessive fees totaling
$62.2 million . . . . In addition, 13 leasing contracts existed for
video gaming equipment that could have been purchased for
$3.2 million but which instead was leased for $40.3 million.
[Moreover] . . . from 1988 through 1992 the U.S. Attorney . . .
identified several instances where tribes involved in gaming
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1994).
350 Wheel of Misfortune , supra  note 346, at 47.
351 David Pace, Casino Boom Bypasses Indians , AP ONLINE, Aug. 31, 2000, avail-
able at  2000 WL 25992632, reprinted as Casino Boom a Bust for Most Members of
Indian Tribes , NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), Sept. 2, 2000, at A1.
352 Id.
353 Follow the Money , supra  note 174, at 85, 92.
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operations lost approximately $500,000 through theft and
embezzlement.354
By 1996, the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC),
which was charged with overseeing Indian gambling was report-
ing that 84 percent of Indian gambling activities were in ‘non-
compliance;’ that is, 84 percent of the tribal gambling activities
were operating illegally or violating federal regulations.355
As the twenty-first century began, however, it appeared that
Native American gambling interests had achieved significant ad-
vances in reaching their sovereignty goals by filing test cases and
the trends were toward continued political and legal efforts in
pursuit of these goals.  One setback to these goals was the 2003
case of Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa In-
dians v. United States .356  The case developed on May 11, 2001,
when Wisconsin Gov. Scott McCallum (R) filed a notice of non-
concurrence with U.S. Secretary of the Interior Gail Norton’s de-
termination on February 20, 2001, that Chippewa tribes could
“conduct gaming on lands to be acquired in trust [i.e., after-ac-
quired property] . . . and [that the gaming] would not be detri-
mental to the surrounding community.”357  The tribal interests
filed a lawsuit challenging the IGRA requirement of gubernato-
rial concurrence as unconstitutional.358
This case highlighted the Interior Department’s negligent dis-
regard, or even ignorance, of the basic socio-economic principles
of gambling:  Gambling activities are almost invariably “detri-
mental to the surrounding community” (which gambling market-
ers designate the “feeder market”359).360  More importantly, the
Interior Department apparently did not even reference the na-
tionally authoritative and relevant study on precisely this issue,
The Economic Impact of Native American Gaming in
354 OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, AUDIT REPORT:  ISSUES IM-
PACTING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT, REPORT
NO. 94-I-113, at 4 (1993).
355 NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTE-
RIOR ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT (1996).
356 259 F. Supp. 2d 783 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
357 Id.  at 787. See  IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (1994).
358 Lac Courte Oreilles Band , 259 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
359 See Gambling’s Crime Multiplier Effect , supra  note 169. See also The Case of
Casinos , supra  note 316; Casinos and Crime , supra  note 197; Suit to Shut Down
Video Gambling , supra  note 312.
360 Lac Courte Oreilles Band , 259 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
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Wisconsin .361
Furthermore, the Final Report  of the 1999 U.S. Gambling
Commission recommended that “comprehensive gambling im-
pact statements” be required before legalizing or authorizing any
proposals to expand gambling.362  Accordingly, it could be con-
vincingly argued that a comprehensive gambling impact state-
ment is required before any tribal gambling activities are allowed
and that those tribal gambling activities that did not perform this
requirement are in violation of IGRA.  Even nontribal gambling
operations could be required to file a comprehensive gambling
impact statement.
In a similar context, the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969363 requires an “environmental impact statement” for any
major federal action which could significantly affect the quality
of the human environment364—which obviously includes gam-
bling facilities on tribal lands under Interior Department aus-
pices or gambling riverboats under the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers.  To determine if the environmental impact statement
can be waived via a “finding of no significant impact,”365 an ini-
tial “environmental assessment” is prepared.366
For example, in the environmental assessment prepared in
February 2002 for the proposed Huron Band-Potawatomi casino
in Calhoun County, Michigan,367 there was no single mention of
the academic literature relating to the socio-economic cost/bene-
fit ratio of 3:1 in the gambling facilities’ feeder markets.368  Ac-
cordingly, the finding of no significant impact issued July 31,
2002, by the Interior Department should not have been issued
361 William Thompson et al., The Economic Impact of Native American Gaming in
Wisconsin , WIS. POL’Y RES. INST. REP., Apr. 1995 [hereinafter WIS. POL’Y RES.
INST.].
362 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, rec. 3.18, at p. 3-19; Laurence Arnold,
Panel Favors Gambling Regulations , AP ONLINE, May 18, 1999, available at  1999
WL 17804745, reprinted as Panel Favors Mandatory ‘Gambling Impact’ Reports ,
DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.), May 19, 1999, at A9 [hereinafter
Mandatory ‘Gambling Impact’ Reports].
363 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
364 Id.  § 4332(2)(c) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2001). See also Mandatory ‘Gam-
bling Impact’ Reports , supra  note 362.
365 See  40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.27 (2001).
366 See  40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (2001).
367 EDAW, INC., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT:  NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND
OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS:  CALHOUN COUNTY GAMING FACILITY (Feb. 2002).
368 For a summary of studies, see The Case of Casinos , supra  note 316, at 153
tbl.2. See also WIS. POL’Y RES. INST., supra  note 361.
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for both procedural and substantive reasons.369  Primarily on
other grounds, the Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos, a
Michigan nonprofit corporation, filed a lawsuit challenging the
Interior Department’s decision-making processes.370
In an example involving Caesars Riverboat Casino in Harrison
County, Indiana, the Corps of Engineers issued a finding of no
significant impact that was similarly remiss, both procedurally
and substantively, in not addressing the academic literature/stud-
ies quantifying the 3:1 cost/benefit ratio in the gambling facilities’
self-identified feeder markets.371  Skeptics could note that pro-
gambling interests would not want to address the 3:1 cost/benefit
issue because almost all gambling proposals would fail this
shibboleth.
Finally in 2003, in TOMAC v. Norton , the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia overruled a U.S. Bureau of Indian
Affairs environmental assessment and finding of no significant
impact.372  Significantly, the court held that “[t]here is a certain
common sense appeal to TOMAC’s argument that a 24-hour-a-
day casino attracting 12,500 visitors per day to a community of
4,600 residents cannot help but have a significant impact on that
community.”373  The U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs was ordered
to analyze “secondary [feeder market?] growth issues”374 be-
cause the court could not decide “whether BIA’s decisionmaking
process was rational based on the conclusory statements in the
record about extensive growth-inducing effects of the casino.”375
F. The Gambling Industry’s PR Legerdemain:  Laying False
Predicates for the U.S. Judiciary?
On December 5, 2003, the U.S. Seventh Circuit issued its deci-
sion on the appeal in Williams v. Aztar .376  The court indicated
369 U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT:  PROPOSED NOT-
TAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS GAMING FACILITY IN EMMETT
TOWNSHIP, MICHIGAN (July 31, 2002).
370 Verified Complaint, CETAC v. Norton, No. 1:02CV01754-TPJ (D.D.C. filed
Aug. 30, 2002).
371 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT:
STATEMENT OF FINDINGS ID NO. 199600554-PMR (1998); Press Release, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Corps of Engineers Issues Gaming Boat Permit (Feb. 10, 1998).
372 TOMAC v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 45, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2003).
373 Id.  at 52.
374 Id.
375 Id.  at 52-53
376 Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp, 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2003).
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that during oral argument the plaintiff’s counsel did “not point to
one RICO case on which he relied, . . . (much less an analogous
case).”377  However, the court ignored the thirty-seven related
cases listed in plaintiff-appellant’s brief,378 as well as the fact that
the RICO civil issues in Williams  were obviously de novo  for the
Seventh Circuit, but were being pursued in multiple venues
throughout the United States.379  Furthermore, the court ex-
panded its purview beyond the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction with
such a statement but then overlooked the well-known federal
case Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co.380 involving RICO, as
well as similar filings381 including the leading-edge Poulos  case in
Nevada federal district court.382  The industry’s arguable delaying
tactics involving cases such as Poulos , which was almost a decade
old when Williams  was argued, appeared to be working in keep-
ing precedent from the U.S. Courts of Appeal.
In addition, the court grouped the casino’s sales promotions as
“nothing more than sales puffery” which demonstrated the
court’s fundamentally flawed assumptions involving the market-
ing of gambling products383 as well as the medical parameters
delimiting pathological and problem gambling via the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders .384
Once the casino receives actual or constructive notice of the
plaintiff’s pathological gambling, would not further enticements
from the casino be more than “puffing”—indeed designed to
take the plaintiff’s property unfairly via the re-entrapment of the
“hooked” gambler (i.e. fraud)?  Thereby, such allurements and
377 Id.  at 300.
378 Brief of Appellant at iii-v, Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d
294 (7th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1822) [hereinafter Williams Appellant Brief].
379 For a summary of multiple issues and cases involving federal civil RICO ac-
tions, see for example, The Merger of Law and Politics in Gambling , supra  note 303.
See also  R. Randall Bridwell, Comment on John Kindt , The Costs of Addicted Gam-
blers:  Should the States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases? , forth-
coming in MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. (2003).
380 Johnson v. Collins Entm’t Co., 199 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 1999), rehg. denied , 204
F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Collins Entm’t Co., 564 S.E.2d 653 (S.C. 2002).
381 Gentry v. Yonce, 522 S.E.2d 137 (S.C. 1999); see also  Poulos v. Caesars World,
Inc., No. CV-5-94-1126-DAE (RJJ) (D. Nev. order entered Dec. 19, 1997).
382 For just one aspect of the complicated Poulos  case (i.e., certification of the
class), see Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 2002 WL 1991180 (D. Nev. June 25, 2002).
383 For marketing fliers, see Williams Appellant Brief, supra  note 378, at Apdx B.
384 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 312.31, at 615-18 (4th ed. 1994).
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the “taking intent” behind these allurements should satisfy
RICO and the policies behind its draftsmanship, because the
pathological gambler, by definition and diagnosis, is helpless to
resist as in drug addiction (and expert testimony should so
demonstrate).
Most importantly, the court made the fundamental mistake of
effectively discounting the civil remedies and concomitant poli-
cies behind RICO as enumerated by one of RICO’s primary au-
thors, Notre Dame Law Professor G. Robert Blakey:
[W]hen elements opposed to RICO suggest that its subject
matter be returned to the states, they really mean that it be
enforced inadequately or not at all, as most state and local
agencies lack the interest or expertise to do sophisticated or-
ganized or white-collar crime investigations or prosecutions,
and state legal systems were primarily designed to deal with
nineteenth century type crimes and torts.  Similarly, when ele-
ments opposed to RICO suggest that its subject matter be en-
forced only or mainly criminally, they really mean that it be
enforced inadequately or not at all .  If our markets are free, it
is not because of the work of public agencies enforcing the
antitrust statutes, as important as they are.  Private enforce-
ment is, in fact, the linchpin of the antitrust statutes.  When
civil rights legislation was under consideration in the 1960s,
many critics emphasized states’ rights, which were then, at
least for some, only a smoke screen behind which to hide a
rotten system of segregation.  Criticism of RICO based on fed-
eralism also looks like a smoke screen behind which the swin-
dlers and others seek to hide.385
The RICO nonenforcement policy pervades the tenor of the Sev-
enth Circuit’s killing and chilling-effect decision in Williams .  Ac-
cordingly, the Seventh Circuit’s decision ran counter to the
trends in other U.S. circuits,386 and the court appeared to have
been misdirected by the mythical assumptions387 promulgated by
the gambling industry’s PR campaigns.388
Also in December of 2003, the Pappas  case was appealed via
the firm of Jenner and Block to the U.S. Supreme Court.389  The
385 G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform , 43 VAND. L. REV.
851, 921-24 (1990) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Myths to Rewrite RICO].
386 See , e.g. , The Merger of Law and Politics in Gambling , supra  note 303, at 660-
92.
387 Compare id. , with Myths to Rewrite RICO , supra  note 385, at 851-924.
388 Compare The Merger of Law and Politics in Gambling , supra  note 303, at 660-
92, with  Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2003).
389 Letter from Harry Pappas to Tom Grey, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Coalition Against
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pivotal issue was “whether casinos  and topless  clubs will be con-
sidered ‘public use’ as defined by the Fifth Amendment390 to the
United States Constitution.”391  As in Poulos ,392 which was filed
in 1994, the 1993 Pappas  case had been delayed for over a dec-
ade,393 which made gambling industry litigators vulnerable to al-
legations of utilizing litigation patterns interposing for delay.
Under the Fifth Amendment the power of eminent domain is
limited by the “takings clause” which states:  “nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation.”394
Until the Pappas  case “public use” included such facilities as
highways, public schools, and government buildings.395
Harry Pappas summarized his family’s case from its 1993 in-
ception as follows:
The Pappas family filed suit in Las Vegas District Court claim-
ing that casinos and topless clubs are not  a “public use,” and
therefore this constituted an unconstitutional taking.  The
court agreed and ordered the property returned.  The city of
Las Vegas and the casinos filed an appeal to the Nevada Su-
preme Court.  Ruling the taking was a “constitutional use of
eminent domain,” the court sided with Las Vegas and the casi-
nos and overturned the district court.  It should be noted that
enormous amounts of “campaign donations” are given to Ne-
vada Supreme Court justices from the casino industry.396
The Nevada Supreme Court decision was appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court in December 2003 and the stakes were large.
Pappas noted the significance of the issues at bar:397
If the city of Las Vegas, casinos, and topless clubs should pre-
vail at the United States Supreme Court, these vice industries,
which are now considered privileged and regulated, will be el-
evated to a constitutional standard and level of power they
could only have dreamed of in the past.  The ramifications for
American society will be devastating and long-lasting.398
The practical impact of the gambling industry winning the Pap-
Legalized Gambling (Dec. 9, 2003) (on file with author) (detailing reasons Pappas
was appealed) [hereinafter Pappas Summary].
390 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
391 Pappas Summary, supra  note 389 (emphasis in original).
392 See  footnotes 18-31, 382 supra  and accompanying text.
393 See  footnotes 252-70 supra  and accompanying text.
394 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
395 See  Pappas Summary, supra  note 389.
396 Id.  (emphasis in original).
397 Id.
398 Id.
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pas  case would be to allow “eminent domain to be used to seize
small business, mom & pop businesses, homes and property for
casinos and topless club expansions [and] would finally give casi-
nos and topless clubs a constitutional standing that they have
never enjoyed before.”399  Combined with virtually unlimited
monetary resources the use of eminent domain by pro-gambling
interests would enthrone those interests as sovereign entities at
odds with the public health, safety, and welfare.
The predictions and historical observations regarding
decriminalized organized gambling made a decade earlier were
becoming truisms by 2003.  These points were summarized dur-
ing the 1995 U.S. Congressional hearings:
[L]egalized gambling interests are utilizing millions of dollars
to misdirect the debate and cause government decisionmakers
and the public to reach invalid conclusions.  First, there is the
incorrect assumption that legalized gambling activities are like
other business activities.  Instead, legalized gambling activities
have large industry-specific negatives, resulting in a cumula-
tive negative economic impact.  Second, the industry’s ten-
dency to focus attention on specialized factors provides a
distorted view of the localized economic positives, while ignor-
ing the large business-economic costs to different regions of
the United States.  Third, the extraordinary amount of money
which is legally used to overwhelm any opposition leads to un-
balanced decisionmaking processes  by elected officials, regula-
tory agencies, and even the court system .  Almost by definition,
there can be little compromise, that is, either the national
economy is a non-gambling one, or it is a legalized gambling
economy which will eventually “bust.”400
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the U.S. judiciary
appeared to be increasingly vulnerable to the PR myths promul-
gated by pro-gambling interests.
G. Gambling Interests as Dogmatists:  Reinventing the Wheel
of Misfortune
The historical record indicates that decriminalized organized
gambling activities invariably lead to new addicted gamblers,
new bankruptcies, and new crime and corruption.  Despite the
dogma of pro-gambling lobbyists to the contrary, decriminalized
organized gambling cannibalizes pre-existing local, regional, and
399 Id.
400 Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 , supra  note 173, at 519-20 (statement of
Univ. of Ill. Prof. John Warren Kindt) (emphasis added).
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national economies and continues to increase the socio-economic
negatives that necessarily accompany the expansion of gambling.
The inordinate monies associated with decriminalized organ-
ized gambling activities have historically corrupted not only lo-
cal, state, and national administrative and legislative
decisionmaking, but also judicial decisionmaking.
In the United States, gambling activities were criminalized dur-
ing most of the twentieth century—and the prohibition of gam-
bling was successful.  Even during the most desperate economic
period of the twentieth century, the Great Depression, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his economic advisors did not con-
sider decriminalizing organized gambling activities because its
dogmatists would invariably catalyze destructive economic
policies.
During the 1990s and early twenty-first century, the social, eco-
nomic, legislative, and judicial trends created by the U.S. flirta-
tion with decriminalized organized gambling activities
continually contributed to destructive results outweighing any
benefits.  History dictates that gambling activities are recriminal-
ized in cycles as the negative consequences of decriminalized or-
ganized gambling activities eventually manifest themselves in
sufficient magnitudes to demand political backlash.
Looking to the impacts of decriminalized organized gambling
on future generations while the governor of Texas, President
George W. Bush (R) summarized the negative conclusions of the
Texas Task Force on Illegal Gambling:
To allow casino style gambling to continue and spread in
places where children play not only offends [those] who have
not approved casino style gambling . . ., but it also sends a
terrible message to our children that gambling is okay.  Casino
gambling is not okay.  It has ruined the lives of too many
adults and it can do the same thing to our children.401
In 1999, the U.S. Gambling Commission unanimously called for a
moratorium on the expansion of any type of gambling anywhere
in the United States.402  The recriminalization of U.S. gambling
will eventually occur in its historical socio-economic cycle.  The
sooner that recriminalization occurs, the sooner U.S. society and
401 GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN TEX., REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN TEXAS cover (1999).
402 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra  note 77, at introduction by Kay C. James.
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the economy will be pump-primed into healthy growth.403
403 Gambling Facilities Transformed into Educational Facilities , supra  note 158.
See also Gambling’s Destabilizing of Economies , supra  note 155; Strategic Economic
Base , supra  note 329.
